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THE CASE FOR CRIMMIGRATION REFORM*
MARY FAN*
The nation is mired in immigration reform debates again.
Leaders vow that this time will be different. The two groups most
targeted by immigration control law over the last century,
Hispanics and Asians, have increased in numbers and in political
power. Conservative leaders are realizing that hostile policies
toward people perceived as foreign are alienating rising
demographic groups and that reform can be a peace offering.
Yet, as in the past, the debate over immigration reform continues
to be dominated by a focus on alleged "amnesty for
lawbreakers" and a fierce divide that doomed reform proposals
in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2010. One side calls for legalizing an
estimated eleven million undocumented people while the other
side decries rewarding lawbreakers. Overlooked in the clash are
problems in the nation's swollen "crimmigration complex" that
endanger values important to each side.
This Article is about curbing the most problematic excesses of the
"crimmigration complex." The Article uses the term
crimmigration complex in two senses, to evoke both the prison-
industrial complex and the complex that distorts behavior in
psychoanalytic theory. First, crimmigration complex refers to the
expanding array of government agencies and private contractors
using the expensive artillery of criminal sanctions to enforce civil
immigration law. Second, crimmigration complex refers to the
competing passions, fears, and history that distort law and policy
choices and fuel immigration criminalization, blocking the
ability to pursue more cost-effective approaches. Breaking free of
crimmigration complex domination requires bridging the fiercely
competing worldviews that have repeatedly stymied immigration
reform. This Article argues that continuing to feed the ravenous
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crimmigration complex endangers values important to both sides
of divide. The Article explores how the impasse-bridging
interests of power, demography, and fiscal responsibility counsel
for crimmigration reform.
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INTRODUCTION
As immigration reform efforts renew, the usual opposed camps
are amassing.' People concerned about softening immigration laws
argue that tough measures are needed to address lawbreakers who
jump the lines and gates necessary to protect the nation's limited
resources and defend against overflooding) People seeking to
liberalize immigration laws argue in terms of the plight of a
permanent underclass of people lacking legal status and their broken
dreams and families.' After fierce clashes, the intractable conflict
stymied immigration reform proposals in 2005,4 2006,1 2007,6 and
1. See, e.g., Michael A. Memoli, Noam N. Levey & Brian Bennett, Senators Unveil
Bipartisan Immigration Plan, but Opposition Looms, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2013), http://
articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/28/nation/la-na-immigration-20130129 (discussing difficulties
in moving immigration reform forward because of party disagreements).
2. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, Administrative Law: Immigration, Amnesty, and the
Rule of Law, 2007 National Lawyers' Convention of the Federalist Society, 36 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1323, 1329-31 (2008) (arguing that amnesty would reward lawbreaking and
encourage illegal immigration that would strain the nation's financial resources); Stephen
H. Legomsky, Portraits of the Undocumented, 44 GA. L. REV. 65, 141-43 (2009) (detailing
the arguments by immigration hardliners concerned about flooding by large masses of
lawbreakers threatening stability and order); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the
Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2087 (2008) (discussing how legalization opponents frame
concerns in rule of law terms); Letter from Edward Tuffy II, President, Local 2544, Nat'l
Border Patrol Council, to Sen. Jon Kyl (May 24, 2007) (expressing concern over rewarding
lawlessness, encouraging massive illegal immigration, threatening security, and
overburdening taxpayers) (on file with author).
3. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-20 (1982) (expressing concern over
creation of a " 'shadow population' of illegal migrants" and the "specter of a permanent
caste of undocumented resident aliens"); Jennifer M. Chac6n, Loving Across Borders:
Immigration Law and the Limits of Loving, 2007 Wis. L. REV. 345, 358-76 (discussing
adverse impacts of immigration law on families); Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, The
Immigrant Rights Marches of 2006 and the Prospects for a New Civil Rights Movement, 42
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 134-35 (2007) (exploring immigrants' shared experiences of
bearing caste-like burdens); Legomsky, supra note 2, at 141-42 (explaining how
proponents of softer approaches on immigration tend to empathize with imagery of
suffering people); Clara Long, Crafting a Productive Debate on Immigration, 47 HARV. J.
ON LEGIs. 167, 168-71 (2010) (presenting narratives of people impacted by immigration
law and policy).
4. Comprehensive Enforcement and Immigration Reform Act of 2005, S. 1438, 109th
Cong. (2005) (co-sponsored by Sens. John Cornyn and Jon Kyl); Secure America and
Orderly Immigration Act, S. 1033, 109th Cong. (2005) (co-sponsored by Sens. John
McCain and Ted Kennedy).
5. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006)
(sponsored by Sen. Arlen Specter).
6. Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007
(Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007), S. 1348, 110th Cong. (2007)
(sponsored by Sen. Harry Reid).
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2010.7 Yet immigration reform is a priority again, with proponents
emboldened by President Obama's re-election after winning record
shares of the two fastest-rising voter demographic groups, Asians and
Hispanics.'
Will demographic change and power shifts break the impasse?
Despite early indications of a change in the conservative stances on
immigration, clashing worldviews are reshaping legislation proposals
and again threatening reform efforts.' Shortly after President
Obama's second inauguration, a bipartisan group of eight senators
unveiled a sketch of proposed immigration reform focused on carving
paths to legalization for unauthorized immigrants."o To salve concerns
7. Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2011 (DREAM
Act), S. 952, 112th Cong. (2010) (co-sponsored by Sens. Dick Durbin and Orrin Hatch);
see also, e.g., Matthew Jaffe, DREAM Act Nightmare: Immigration Bill Dies in Senate,
ABC NEWS BLOGS (Dec. 18, 2010, 12:03 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics
/2010/12/dream-act-nightmare-immigration-bill-dies-in-senate/ (reporting on battle). For a
look back at some of the fanfare and contestation over earlier proposals, see, for example,
Rachel L. Swarns, Failed Amnesty Legislation of 1986 Haunts the Current Immigration
Bills in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2006, at A20 (describing controversy); Rachel L.
Swarns, Senate in Bipartisan Act, Passes an Immigration Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at
A19 (reporting on a Senate bill that would create paths for undocumented immigrants to
become American citizens, co-sponsored by Sens. John McCain, and Edward M.
Kennedy); Laura Meckler, Obama to Push for Vote on DREAM Act, WALL ST. J.
WASHINGTON WIRE BLOG (Nov. 16, 2010, 7:33 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire
/2010/11/16/obama-to-push-for-vote-on-dream-act/ (describing immigration advocates'
hopes for the DREAM Act).
8. See, e.g., Pamela Constable & Luz Lazo, Hispanics, Asians Party-and Flex
Political Muscle, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2013, at C1 (describing record win and influence of
rising groups); Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Most Children Younger than Age 1
Are Minorities (May 17, 2012), available at http://www.census.gov/newsroom
/releases/archives/population/cbl2-90.html (reporting that Hispanics are the fastest-rising
minority group and the largest, at over 16.7% of the population while Asians are the
second fastest-rising minority group).
9. See, e.g., HENRY BARBOUR ET AL., REPUBLICAN NAT'L COMM., GROWTH &
OPPORTUNITY PROJECr 8 (2013) (stating that to win back Hispanics, Republicans "must
embrace and champion comprehensive immigration reform"); Gary Martin, Gang of 8
Still Optimistic About Immigration Reform, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 19, 2013,
available at 2013 WLNR 9605697 (discussing continued optimism despite defeat of
bipartisan gun control legislation); Julia Preston, Urging Conservatives to Back
Immigration Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2013, at A19 (discussing conservative efforts
to "change the conversation on immigration" and guarded optimism for passing
immigration reform legislation); Jonathan Weisman, In Round 3, Immigration Bill Faces
Senate Opponent Who Won Rounds I and 2, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2013, at A14 (discussing
efforts to derail bipartisan immigration reform legislation).
10. See Memorandum from Sens. Chuck Schumer, John McCain, Dick Durbin,
Lindsey Graham, Robert Menendez, Marco Rubio, Michael Bennet & Jeff Flake,
Bipartisan Framework for Comprehensive Immigration Reform 1-2, 4 (Jan. 28, 2013),
[hereinafter Immigration Reform Memorandum], available at http://www.nytimes.comlint
eractive/2013/01/23/us/politics/28immigration-principles-document.html?_r=0 (unveiling
2013 version of comprehensive immigration reform proposal). Another early bill would
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that legalization, also dubbed amnesty, would lead to a surge of
undocumented migration, as occurred after the 1986 amnesty," the
proposal also promises to further build up borders "with the latest
technology, infrastructure and personnel." 12 As unveiled in the
United States Senate, the proposed legislation begins with provisions
on increasing border policing and prosecutions and then tackles the
controversial issue of legalization."
Despite the compromise and crafting, opponents saw "amnesty
for lawbreakers"-and saw red.14 Some raised cost concerns, arguing
that legalization would cost U.S. taxpayers $6.3 trillion over the next
decades because of the extension of social services and healthcare to
the legalized." Opponents have also decried the "amnesty first,
border security whenever" approach and proposed a host of
amendments such as requiring proof of "effective control" of the
border for six months before granting provisional status. Some
House representatives also struck back, introducing a bill that
heightens interior tracking of undocumented immigrants, raises
loosen immigration restrictions to admit greater numbers of certain skilled workers
desired by powerful businesses, such as the technology industry, reviving efforts that
faltered in 2007. Immigration Innovation Act of 2013 (I-Squared Act of 2013), S. 169,
113th Cong. (2013).
11. In 1986, Congress passed landmark legislation that legalized approximately three
million undocumented immigrants who entered the United States before January 1, 1982,
and met a continuous residence requirement. Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 201, 100 Stat. 3359, 3394 (1986).
12. Immigration Reform Memorandum, supra note 10, at 1; see also, e.g., Four More
Years; The Future of GOP, Fox NEWS, Nov. 8, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 23871071
(transcript of statements of Eric Boiling, co-host, and Charles Krauthammer,
commentator) (discussing "amnesty for illegals"); Swarns, Failed Amnesty Legislation of
1986 Haunts the Current Immigration Bills in Congress, supra note 7, at Al (discussing
concerns over another surge in undocumented immigration following a grant of amnesty).
13. See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization
Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. §§ 5, 1102-12, 2101-03 (2013), available at http://www.govtrack
.us/congress/bills/113/s744/text (proposing middle ground on immigration reform).
14. Beth Reinhard, Mounting Signs of GOP Rebellion Against Immigration Reform,
NAT'L J. DAILY, June 7, 2013, available at 2013 WLNR 14256302 (discussing stirrings of
Republican revolt); Michael D. Shear & Ashley Parker, Battle Lines Drawn Over
Legislation on Immigration, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 11, 2013, available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/Inacademic/?verb=sr&csi=8357 (describing decrial of
"amnesty for lawbreakers").
15. David Nakamura, Conservatives Split on Immigration Bill's Price Tag, WASH.
POST, May 7, 2013, at A5.
16. See, e.g., Matthew Fleming, Boxer: GOP Opposition to Immigration Reform
Risky, ORANGE CNTY. REGISTER, June 14, 2013, available at 2013 WLNR 14673606
(summarizing nearly 100 amendments that senators proposed to the bipartisan
legislation); Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., Amending a Dangerous Immigration Plan, WASH.
TIMES, June 4, 2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/4/amending-a-
dangerous-immigration-plan/ (decrying "amnesty-first, border security-whenever" plan).
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federal penalties for immigration-related offenses, and authorizes
states and localities to enact immigration control laws." In the clash
of competing worldviews, problems in the nation's crimmigration
complex remain unaddressed-and may be worsened by the saber-
rattling.
This Article is about an area neglected in the recurrent collisions
in worldviews over immigration reform-the need for crimmigration
reform. This Article uses the term "crimmigration complex" in two
senses, to evoke both the prison-industrial complex, and the complex
that distorts behavior in psychoanalytic theory. "Crimmigration"
refers to the use of criminal sanctions to enforce civil immigration law
and the increasing erosion of boundaries between criminal and civil
immigration law," while the prison-industrial complex refers to the
convergence of bureaucratic, political, and private interests that
benefit from incarceration spending." "Crimmigration complex"
refers to the government agencies and private companies that grow
and benefit from using criminal sanctions to enforce civil immigration
law. The term crimmigration complex is also meant to be evocative of
the notion of a complex in psychoanalytic theory, referring to how
memory, emotions, perceptions, and wishes in tension can distort
behavior.20 The Article uses the term "crimmigration complex" to
refer to the government agencies and private companies that grow
and benefit from using criminal sanctions to enforce civil immigration
law. The crimmigration complex has swelled dramatically over the
decades, fed by these recurrent political flare-ups.2' The term
crimmigration complex also refers to how the freight of history,
17. Strengthen and Fortify Enforcement Act (SAFE Act), H.R. 2278, 113th Cong.
§§ 102-06, 114, 312-17 (2013), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/news/2013
/GOWDY_006_xml.pdf.
18. See Jennifer M. Chac6n, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the
Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1574 (2010);
Mary Fan, Rebellious State Crimmigration Enforcement and the Foreign Affairs Power, 89
WASH. U. L. REV. 1269,1277 (2012); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants,
Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 372-73, 376 (2006).
19. See Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1,
1998, at 51, 54, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1998/12/the-
prison-industrial-complex/304669/.
20. See DUANE P. SCHULTZ & SYDNEY ELLEN SCHULTZ, THEORIES OF
PERSONALITY 84 (5th ed. 1994).
21. For a discussion of the rise in immigration prosecutions, see infra Part II. For
accounts of how immigration enforcement has contributed to incarceration, see, for
example, Tanya Golash-Boza, The Immigration Industrial Complex: Why We Enforce
Immigration Policies Destined to Fail, 3 SOC. COMPASS 295, 295-300 (2009); Michael
Welch, The Role of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the Prison-Industrial
Complex, 27 SOC. JUST. 73, 74-76 (2000).
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competing desires, fears, and inflamed perceptions fuel recurrent
flare-ups of furor over immigration and resort to criminal sanctions to
enforce nominally civil immigration law.
Recurring clashes over alleged "amnesty for illegals" is a status
competition between worldviews that blinds both sides to the
crimmigration investigation and surveillance problems that roused
rising voter groups and created the impetus for immigration reform.22
What galvanized the rising demographic of Hispanics and Asians-
both voting citizens and noncitizens-are problems with overbreadth
in immigration investigation and criminalization.23 Overbreadth
means casting the web of investigation and incarceration too broadly,
leading to concerns such as problematic targeting practices and
wasteful spending that bloats the crimmigration complex.24 Three
major overbreadth problems include (1) investigating Americans of
particular racial and ethnic backgrounds as potential aliens, (2)
spending millions to prosecute immigrants without criminal histories
before civilly deporting them, and (3) paying billions to confine
immigrants who do not pose a flight or danger risk in a massively
expanded civil incarceration complex.25
Continuing to feed the ravenous crimmigration complex
endangers values important to the worldviews on both sides of the
traditional immigration reform divide. To achieve crimmigration
reform, it is crucial to argue in terms of interests and values that
appeal to people of competing worldviews. Focusing on impasse-
bridging interests, the Article argues that power, demography, and
fiscal responsibility counsel for crimmigration reform.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the split in
worldviews that generates recurrent cycles of failed immigration
reform and the fierce focus on the most polarizing issue of alleged
amnesty. The conflict blinds reformers to other issues in need of
attention. To progress, reformers need to focus on issues that
engender values important to the main competing worldviews. This
22. See infra Parts I, II.A-B.
23. See infra Part II.A-B.
24. Cf., e.g., Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491,
1492 (2008) (cataloging traditional critiques of overbreadth in criminal law, including
waste of resources and risk of arbitrary or discriminatory targeting); Jennifer M. Chac6n,
Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 613, 645-50 (2012)
(discussing rise in immigration prosecutions and state laws criminalizing immigration);
David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 157, 165-75 (2012) (discussing surging immigration prosecutions and programs such
as Operation Streamline).
25. See infra Parts 1, 11.
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Article argues that crimmigration overbreadth is an issue that
threatens values important to both sides of the traditional divide.
Part II argues that power and demography-specifically the need
to woo increasingly crucial Hispanic and Asian voters-counsel for
attention to curbing crimmigration overbreadth. This Article uses the
term "crimmigration overbreadth" to refer to the broad structure of
immigration criminalization designed to permit wide discretion over
which groups to target for surveillance, investigation, and
stigmatization. This Article discusses the historical genesis of
overbreadth in criminal immigration law from the nation's earliest
days in 1789. Tracing the history lays bare the ambition behind the
overbreadth strategy of conferring the flexibility and discretion to
target groups perceived as undesirable because of national origin,
ethnicity, or race. The strategy is now backfiring, however, because
demographic change has broken the bonds of law and generated the
potential to change the past paradigms.
Part III argues that the interest of fiscal responsibility and
curbing waste also counsel for curbing crimmigration overbreadth.
This Part discusses the drain on crime prevention dollars because of
the rise of the vast immigration prosecution and incarceration
complex. As recent bipartisan progress in reducing incarceration
bloat and expense shows, arguments about fiscal responsibility and
preventing waste have the potential to build coalitions across
traditional divides.26
Part IV of this Article is about immigration criminalization and
detention reform that addresses the overbreadth problems. Reform
does not mean abolition. Part of the challenge of breaking out of the
endless loop of finger-pointing and standing still on immigration
reform is avoiding the accusation of radical abolition from one camp,
and the belief that there can be no progress without upending the
current legal regime from the other camp. Part IV proposes two
alternative reforms to immigration criminalization and civil detention
laws that curb the worst of the waste and harmful consequences of
immigration investigation and incarceration overbreadth.
First, this Article proposes that current laws criminalizing
entering or being found in the United States require indicia of risk,
such as significant criminal history, in addition to mere alien status.
Because alienage is still strongly associated with particular races or
ethnicities, having criminalization turn on alienage alone generates
controversial racial profiling and investigation overbreadth problems.
26. See infra Parts IV.A and C; infra notes 49, 366, 369 and accompanying text.
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Requiring more than mere alienage breaks the racial relevance
rationale. Requiring indicia of risk also better directs expensive
prosecution and criminal processing resources to cases of greater
concern rather than prosecuting only to deport, which could be
accomplished civilly. Second, the Article proposes that the federal
immigration detention system should learn from the states that have
turned to more cost-effective alternatives to incarceration to cut costs
and waste.
I. THE NEED TO BRIDGE CLASHING WORLDVIEWS OVER
IMMIGRATION REFORM
Immigration reform attempts resemble a national banging of
heads against the wall, thudding futilely in 2005,27 2006,28 2007,29 and
2010 3 0-and renewing again. Clashing worldviews have repeatedly
stymied progress, with both sides arguing in sharply different moral
registers. This Part discusses the two main conflicting worldviews
because, in order to understand what has stymied immigration reform
thus far, it is important to understand the underlying competition that
fuels ferocity.
For analytical purposes, the two central conflicting worldviews
can be classified as hierarchist and egalitarian. The terms come from
an elegantly simple anthropological classification that has proved
productive in legal scholarship over fiercely-fought topics such as gun
control or police use of force.31 Lawyers and scholars harbor the
27. See Comprehensive Enforcement and Immigration Reform Act of 2005, S. 1438,
109th Cong. (2005) (co-sponsored by Sens. John Cornyn and Jon Kyl); Secure America
and Orderly Immigration Act, S. 1033, 109th Cong. (2005) (co-sponsored by Sens. John
McCain and Ted Kennedy).
28. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006)
(sponsored by Sen. Arlen Specter).
29. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong. (2007)
(sponsored by Sen. Harry Reid).
30. Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2011 (DREAM
Act), S. 952, 112th Cong. (2010) (co-sponsored by Sens. Dick Durbin and Orrin Hatch);
see also, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 7.
31. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition:
Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465,
474, 485-86 (2007); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A
Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1310-14 (2003); Dan
M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going To
Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837,
859 (2009). For classic accounts beginning with anthropologist Mary Douglas's work, see,
for example, MARY DOUGLAS, CULTURAL BIAS 6, 8-13 (1978) (framing group-grid
theory with Durkheimian influences); MARY DOUGLAS & AARON B. WILDAVSKY, RISK
AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
DANGERS 67-70, 175-88 (1982) (applying theory to environmental risk perception); Mary
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fantasy that argument and evidence can convince and even change
opinions. The reality, however, is that people often talk past each
other and interpret or reject evidence in conformity with their
worldviews, particularly on controversial issues.32 Arguments and
facts are perceived through the screen of one's cultural orientation
which can be grouped into a few main categories.33
For economy of analysis, the main categories fall along two axes.
The first is hierarch-egalitarian, a measure of attitudes toward social
ordering, authority, and stratification.3 4 The hierarch orientation is
toward order, ruliness, power, and the use of classifications to
distribute rights, entitlements, goods, and duties." Egalitarians, even
when they hold power, tend to be troubled by stratification in rights,
protections, and life opportunities.36 The second axis is individualist-
communitarian. Individualists value self-sufficiency, autonomy, and
non-intervention while communitarians are oriented toward
communal duties of care and group solidarity.37
For purposes of the polarization in immigration debates, the
dominant divide is hierachist-egalitarian because immigration
Douglas, Introduction to ESSAYS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 3-6 (Mary Douglas
ed., 1982) (providing overview of theory); Karl Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the
Perception of Risk: An Analysis of Contemporary Worldviews and Cultural Biases, 22 J.
CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 61, 63, 65 (1991) (framing theory in terms of psychology
and political influences on perception).
32. See, e.g., DOUGLAS, CULTURAL BIAS, supra note 31, at 8-13 (explaining theory);
Dan M. Kahan, Cultural Cognition as a Conception of the Cultural Theory of Risk, in
HANDBOOK OF RISK THEORY: EPISTEMOLOGY, DECISION THEORY, ETHICS AND
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF RISK 725, 742-43 (Sabine Roeser et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter
Kahan, HANDBOOK OF RISK THEORY] (explaining experiment that confirmed importance
of worldviews in risk theory); Mark E. Koltko-Rivera, The Psychology of Worldviews, 8
REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 3, 3-4 (2004) (discussing prevalence and value of theory); see also,
e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., "They Saw a Protest": Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-
Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 884 (2012) (finding that perceptions of
whether protesters were expressing dissent or physically intimidating others were shaped
by cultural cognition).
33. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115,
122-24 (2007) (explaining usefulness of insights for understanding fiercely-fought
conflicts); see also Koltko-Rivera, supra note 32, at 10-12 (explaining various influential
theories of worldviews, including the value orientations approach of anthropologist
Florence Rockwood Kluckhohn).
34. See Kahan, HANDBOOK OF RISK THEORY, supra note 32, at 727 fig.28.1.
35. See JONATHAN GROSS & STEVE RAYNER, MEASURING CULTURE 6 (1985).
36. See generally Steve Rayner, The Perception of Time and Space in Egalitarian Sects:
A Millenarian Cosmology, in ESSAYS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 247 (Mary
Douglas ed. 1982) (describing the theory of millenarianism through a discussion of social
group classification).
37. See Kahan, HANDBOOK OF RISK THEORY, supra note 32, at 727-28 (discussing
communitarian worldviews).
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strongly implicates issues of stratification in the distribution of
entitlements. Within the central divide, the forms of arguments that
most resonate will depend on whether one is individualist or
communitarian. For example, hierarchical-individualists may
emphasize that undocumented immigrants cut past people who
waited their turn in line, are not self-sufficient, are trespassers, and
need to be held individually accountable." Hierarchical-
communitarians may marshal arguments that undocumented
immigrants harm communities by draining social services and jobs
and change the neighborly feel and cultural compatibility of a
nation.39 Conversely, egalitarian-individualists may be moved by
narratives about the stunting of individual self-actualization.40
Egalitarian-communitarians may be concerned about a permanent
underclass in American society and community responsibilities
towards people residing in the nation regardless of immigration
status.41
38. See, e.g., Steve Lash, Clash Erupts on Amnesty Plan for Undocumented
Immigrants, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 13, 2000, at 14A (quoting Representative Lamar Smith
as stating, "Amnesty sends the message, 'Do not respect our laws. If you come to the
United States illegally, you will be rewarded,' " and quoting Representative Tom
Tancredo calling amnesty an insult to Border Patrol agents and "grossly unfair" to people
who comply with immigration law and wait their turn).
39. See generally Expert Report & Affidavit of Steven A. Camarota, Illegal
Immigration's Impact on Public Education & Communities, Lozano v. City of Hazelton,
496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (No. 06-cv-01586-JMM), 2006 WL 4129442
(discussing adverse community impact of unauthorized immigration); Press Release, Fed'n
for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), President's Immigration Reform Plan Places
Interests of Illegal Aliens Ahead of Americans, Says FAIR (Jan. 29, 2013),
http://www.fairus.org/news/president-s-immigration-reform-plan-places-interests-of-illegal
-aliens-ahead-of-americans-says-fair (discussing concerns over impact on American
community).
40. See, e.g., Manlin Chee, Editorial, Latest Immigration Proposal Wrong, Risking
Loss of Fine Minds, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC. (Greensboro, N.C.), Sept. 18, 1995, at
A4 ("The American Dream for immigrants is to live in privacy, enjoy our family and
friends, earn and save a lot of money and contribute to the futures of our American
grandchildren."); Editorial, Dreams Crushed, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2007, at A24
(describing the problems undocumented students face in obtaining citizenship); Kirk
Semple, In New Jersey, Uncertainty for Measures Offering In-State Tuition to Illegal
Residents, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2009, at A20 (offering account of student hoping for
legislative intervention on immigration reform).
41. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-20 (1982) (trying to alleviate harms of
having a " 'shadow population' of illegal migrants" and the "specter of a permanent caste
of undocumented resident aliens" through Equal Protection doctrine). While egalitarian-
individualist arguments have been dominant in antidiscrimination analysis, new influential
visions are unfolding. Martha Fineman's vulnerabilities theory, which illuminates the need
for greater state responsiveness to shared human vulnerability, has aspects of egalitarian-
communitarian vision that can add fresh insights to diverse domains, including
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While the hierarch outlook often seems to correspond more with
Republicans or conservatives and the egalitarian outlook with
Democrats or liberals, immigration battles are a prime example of
how the fault lines can be more complex. For example, President
George W. Bush and Republican Senator John McCain were among
the prime architects and advocates of a prior immigration reform bill
carving paths to legalization for undocumented people among other
measures.4 2 The bill collapsed in 2007 after opposition blocs formed in
Congress that did not just follow party lines, with close to one-third of
Senate Democrats helping to block the legislation.43
Examining intractable and fierce legal debates through the lens
of clashing worldviews helps explain why we have so much talk with
so little persuasion in immigration. People are often arguing in terms
that matter for people of their worldview rather than the group they
are trying to convince. In the immigration reform context, hierarchs
and egalitarians often appear to be talking-or shouting fiercely-
past each other. In all the shouting and conflict, both camps may miss
opportunities for progress on immigration reforms sorely in need of
redress that endanger values important to each side. Even more
dangerously, fixating on a particularly polarizing issue such as
legalization risks intensifying other systemic problems that threaten
values important to both sides.
Reformers hoping to transform the current status quo need to
speak in terms that can bridge the clash with hierarchs. Liberal-
egalitarians must be particularly attentive to the need to bridge
worldviews because social psychology evidence suggests that liberals
have a tougher time anticipating and reaching out to people who
value principles such as caring, equality, and anti-oppression less than
they do." What seems intuitively morally compelling to liberals may
not be so intuitive to conservatives, who may have a different
interpretation of guiding values and how to weigh competing
principles.4 5 To liberals, arguing in terms that appeal to conservatives
such as fiscal responsibility and political power-building may seem to
immigration. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the
Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 255 (2010) (framing approach).
42. Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007
(Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007), S. 1348, 110th Cong. (2007).
43. See Robert Pear & Carl Hulse, Immigration Bill Fails to Survive Senate Vote, N.Y.
TIMES (June 28, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/28/washington/28cnd-immig.html
? r=0.
44. See JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE
DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION 163, 182-85 (2012).
45. See id. at 182, 184.
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denigrate values they hold paramount and self-evident. Yet the ability
to bridge worldviews and argue in different value registers is crucial
to accommodate the diversity of perspectives and value systems as
well as to accomplish the practical task of reform.
Arguments about fiscal responsibility and political power-
building have the potential to bridge competing worldviews and spark
progress on long-entrenched problems.46 Indeed, at the state level,
concerns over fiscal responsibility and waste have built bipartisan
support for finding more cost-effective alternatives to incarceration,
drawing in leaders associated with hierarchist politics such as Newt
Gingrich.47 Reformers on the left call it being smart on crime while
reformers on the right call it being right on crime.48 Federal criminal
justice, however, has largely escaped needed scrutiny. Viewing
immigration reform through the lenses of fiscal responsibility and
what has galvanized rising voter groups also yields fresh insights
about what aspects of immigration law are in need of reform and are
being overlooked in the furor over red-flag issues such as alleged
amnesty.49 The subsequent sections examine how power,
demography, and money counsel for reform of some of the most
wasteful and overbroad aspects of civil immigration incarceration and
criminal immigration laws.
II. DEMOGRAPHY, POWER, AND THE BACKFIRING OF THE
INTIMIDATION STRATEGY
Depending on one's perspective, a major impetus for the current
immigration reform revival is poetic, ironic, or frightening.
Comprehensive immigration reform today is spurred by the politics of
inclusion rather than exclusion and fueled by the need to bow to-
46. See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., From "Overcriminalization" to "Smart on Crime":
American Criminal Justice Reform-Legacy and Prospects, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 597,
609-12 (2011) (discussing how reframing overcriminalization as being smarter on crime
helps gain traction, particularly as governments facing economic challenges must do less
with more); Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law,
90 N.C. L. REV. 581, 620, 623, 634 (2012) (discussing how conservatives have begun
advocating for reducing incarceration when framed as fiscal responsibility, smarter and
more cost-effective spending and averting waste).
47. See infra notes 369-73 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 369 and accompanying text.
49. In another example of the fractiousness of immigration debate, even words are
fiercely fought. Though formerly a commonplace term, the word amnesty has become a
red flag for immigration hardliners because of its connotations of pardoning lawbreakers
and association with the controversial immigration amnesty of 1986, after which
unauthorized immigration to the United States surged. See Swarns, Failed Amnesty
Legislation of 1986 Haunts the Current Immigration Bills in Congress, supra note 7, at A20.
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rather than combat-demographic change. 0 Immigration overhaul is
pitched as a promise to Asian and Hispanic Americans who have
burst the bonds of immigration control laws historically aimed at
restraining their population rise." Controversial new immigration
investigation and surveillance laws and birthright citizenship-stripping
proposals meant to strike fear in suspected undocumented
immigrants have backfired, galvanizing crucial rising demographic
groups of voters.52 In a democracy, with numbers comes power to
help define the future of the laws."
This Part describes the rise of immigrant Americans and the
growing imperative to curtail immigration investigation and
surveillance overbreadth. Immigration investigation overbreadth
refers to the expanding package of surveillance, investigation, and
criminalization that impacts the rising demographic of Americans
perceived as immigrants as well as actual immigrants. Controversial
immigration status investigation laws and proposals such as
eliminating birthright citizenship are creating a sense of linked fate
between Americans perceived as foreigners and immigrants. This
Part also discusses the legal-structural roots of some of the most
controversial aspects of immigration investigation overbreadth and
the preservation by transformation of the historical ambition of
discretion to criminally brand and target undesirables due to race,
ethnicity, or national origin.
50. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Republicans Reconsider Positions on Immigration, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2012, at A12 (discussing changing political stances toward immigration
reform because of rising and shifting voter power dynamics).
51. See, e.g., Mariano Castillo, Five Reasons Why Time May Be Right for Immigration
Reform, CNN (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/13/politics/immigration-reform-
five-reasons/index.html (discussing immigration reform as a promise to court key voter
groups); David Grant, Immigration Reform: "This Will Be the Year," Bipartisan "Gang"
Says, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 28, 2013, available at 2013 WLNR 2203629
(discussing how immigration reform was a key campaign promise and important issue in
determining the 2012 elections and how the election results are transforming the politics of
reform).
52. See infra notes 73-104 and accompanying text.
53. Cf Cristina M. Rodrfguez, Latinos: Discrete and Insular No More, 12 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 41, 43, 47-48 (2009) (predicting that with the growth of the Latino
population in size and diversity, "the group's size increasingly will demand that it protect
its interests through the political process," wielding growing voting and bargaining power).
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A. The Rise of Immigrant Americans and the New Imperatives of
Immigration Reform
Feared and desired, Asian and Hispanic voters are rising in
political import.54 Hispanics are the largest and fastest-growing
minority group in America, constituting 16.7% of the population as of
2011.11 More than half of the total United States population growth
between 2000 and 2010 was due to the increasing Hispanic
population.16 Hispanic voters are also the fastest-growing part of the
electorate." While a smaller fraction of the population and growing at
a slower rate than Hispanics, Asians were still the most rapidly rising
racial group over the last decade," since Hispanics are counted as an
ethnic group in official demography.59
The labels of Asian and Hispanic in demographic analysis lump
together diverse groups with differing histories, cultures, and politics
of color and history.60 Asian and Hispanic voters may be generations-
54. See, e.g., Jim Morrill, A "Wake-Up Call," for Republican Party, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Jan. 25, 2013, at Al (discussing how demographics are changing political
imperatives); Michael D. Shear, As Electorate Changes, Fresh Worry for G.O.P., N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at Al (describing the realization among conservatives of the need to
court the rising demographic of Asian and Hispanic voters); John McCormick and Todd
Shields, Republicans Losing Key States as Hispanics Shun Party, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.businessweek.cominews/2012-11-08/hispanic-
political-clout-seen-in-2012-election-and-beyond (discussing import).
55. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 8.
56. SHARON R. ENNIS ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE HISPANIC POPULATION:
2010, at 2 (2011).
57. MATE BARRETO, ETHNIC CUES 2 (2010).
58. ELIZABETH M. HOEFFEL ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE ASIAN
POPULATION: 2010, at 1, 3-4 (2012).
59. For now, at least, in official demography, Hispanics are designated an ethnic
rather than racial group and distinguished from non-Hispanic whites. See, e.g., ENNIS ET
AL., supra note 56, at 2 (explaining ethnic categorization). Yet Hispanics are often socially
constructed as a race in perception, social construction, and historical treatment under the
law. See, e.g., LAURA E. GOMEZ, MANIFEST DESTINIES: THE MAKING OF THE MEXICAN
AMERICAN RACE 4-5, 9-10, 117-18, 150, 153 (2007) (explaining the social, legal and
perceptual construction of the "Mexican race"). For the 2020 census, the U.S. Census
Bureau is considering adding Latino or Hispanic as a racial category. Lornet Turnbull,
Latinos May Be Race Category in Census, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 30, 2012),
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2019032486 censuschange3lm.html.
60. See, e.g., ENNIS ET AL., supra note 56, at 2 (" 'Hispanic or Latino' refers to a
person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish
culture or origin regardless of race."); HOEFFEL ET AL., supra note 58, at 2 (explaining
that under Office of Management and Budget definitions, " 'Asian' refers to a person
having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian
subcontinent, including, for example, Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia,
Pakistan, the Philippine Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam"); Marcelo M. Sudrez-Orozco &
Mariela M. Plez, Introduction to LATINOS: REMAKING AMERICA 1, 3-4 (Marcelo M.
Subrez-Orozco & Mariela M. Piez eds., Univ. of Cal. Press 2008) (discussing diversity of
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deep Americans, perhaps with roots to the nation's early days.6 Yet
they are immigrant Americans in the sense that they are often
perceived as immigrants and share a linked fate of spillover
treatment, such as suspicion and hostility, with the predominant
immigrant groups-people of Asian or Hispanic backgrounds.62
Regardless of formal status in law, Asians and Hispanics are
often still perceived as foreigners-the iconic aliens-and adversely
impacted by spreading regimes of immigration surveillance,
investigation, and stigmatization. 63  Because the artillery of
immigration law has been so forcefully concentrated historically on
Asians and Hispanics, immigration is a matter of great import to
many members of these crucial rising voter demographic groups. Polls
and studies indicate that Hispanics and Asians from diverse
backgrounds have a strong sense of linked fate and immigrant
experiences, backgrounds and fissures around race, background and color); see also, e.g.,
Carole J. Uhlaner & F. Chris Garcia, Learning Which Party Fits, in DIVERSITY IN
DEMOCRACY: MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 72, 75, 81, 92 (Gary
M. Segura & Shaun Bowler eds., 2006) (presenting data on party affiliation from the
Latino National Political Survey and noting differences depending on background; for
example, whether one is Mexican-American or Cuban-American).
61. See, e.g., JUAN GONZALEZ, HARVEST OF EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF LATINOS IN
AMERICA 8 (2000) (tracing history and noting that a Latino/mestizo population has
existed continuously in several United States regions since before the founding of the first
English colonies at Jamestown and Massachusetts Bay); Program Information,
ANCESTORS IN THE AMERICAS (2001), available at http://www.pbs.org
/ancestorsintheamericas/programl_1.html (tracing the history of Asians in America back
as early as the 1700s).
62. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourteenth Chronicle: American Apocalypse,
32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 275, 290 (1997) (explaining how immigration laws impact the
children of Latinos and Asians); Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration
Law: Employer Sanctions and Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 680-81 (1997)
(discussing adverse impact of laws criminalizing undocumented immigrants on Asians and
Hispanics mistakenly perceived as foreign); Sandra Lilley, Poll: 1 Out of 3 Americans
Inaccurately Believe Most Hispanics Are Undocumented, NBC LATINO (Sept. 12, 2012,
1:37 PM), http://nbclatino.com/2012/09/12/poll-1-out-of-3-americans-think-most-hispanics-
are-undocumented/ (reporting on poll results finding that more than 30% of respondents
overestimated that more than half of Latinos in the United States are illegal immigrants).
63. See, e.g., Cecelia M. Espenoza, The Illusory Provisions of Sanctions: The
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 343, 347 n.36 (1994)
(referring to the commonplace "practice to refer to individuals with a Hispanic or Asian
ethnic lineage as an individual who appears 'foreign' "); Kevin R. Johnson, The
Intersection of Race and Class in U.S. Immigration Law and Enforcement, 72 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 17 & nn.93-95 (2009) (collecting cases of Asian-Americans and
Hispanic-Americans being targeted by law enforcement because they were mistaken for
unlawful aliens).
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heritage-particularly intensified by perceptions of discrimination
and anti-immigrant attacks."
Figure 1 charts the rise of Hispanics and Asians by plotting
intercensus data from the United States Census Bureau's population
estimates program.65 Note the inflection point, marked on the graph,
when Hispanics overtook African Americans to become the most
populous minority group in America. Non-Hispanic whites remain
the majority group-for now. But consider the slopes of the graph.
The slopes show growth trends, which are significantly steeper for
Hispanics than all other groups, especially non-Hispanic whites. The
rise in numbers is remarkable because for the last century, Asians and
Hispanics have been the prime targets of immigration law's attempt
at population restriction.6 6 Indeed, tight quotas on Asian immigration
have kept Asian numbers lower so that even as the fastest-growing
race over the last decade, by the time of the 2010 decennial census,
Asians represented just 4.8% of the population.6 7
64. See, e.g., BARRETO, supra note 57, at 26-27, 31 (collecting studies and data);
Johnson & Hing, supra note 3, at 136 (noting that Latinos and Asian Americans
"generally are more concerned with the excesses of immigration law and enforcement").
65. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION ESTIMATES, HISTORICAL DATA,
http://www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/index.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2013).
66. See, e.g., DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY (2010) (detailing the history of the deportation practices in
America); ELMER CLARENCE SANDMEYER, THE ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN
CALIFORNIA (1973) (describing efforts to exclude Chinese immigrants, leading up to the
Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882); Mary D. Fan, Post-Racial Proxies: Resurgent State and
LocalAnti-"Alien" Laws, 32 CARDOzO L. REV. 905, 911-22 (2011) (describing the history
of Asian immigration); Margot K. Mendelson, Constructing America: Mythmaking in U.S.
Immigration Courts, 119 YALE L.J. 1012, 1018-25 (2010) (focusing on early efforts to
exclude immigrants from America, including the use of national origins quotas).
67. See William R. Tamayo, Asian Americans and Present U.S. Immigration Policies:
A Legacy of Asian Exclusion, in ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT 1112
(Hyung-Chan Kim ed., 1992) (discussing impact of quota system); see also HOEFFEL ET
AL., supra note 58, at 4 & tbl.1 (providing population proportion figures). Asians alone or
in combination with other races accounted for 5.6% of the population. Id.
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FIGURE 1. DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES - 1990-2011
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Not long ago Hispanic and Asian political affiliations were up for
grabs.6' Both groups had a strong reservoir of people who were
undecided, unpoliticized, or unaffiliated with either Republicans or
Democrats.69 Strategists thought that the Republican Party was a
natural fit for Asians and Hispanics because of their traditional family
values and conservative outlooks on social and law-and-order issues.70
68. See, e.g., Pei-ti Lien et al., Asian Pacific-American Public Opinion and Political
Participation, 34 POL. SCI. & POL. 625, 629 (2001) (reporting that 51% of Asian Americans
surveyed either did not think of themselves in political terms, were independent, were
uncertain about their political affiliation, or declined to state); Rodolfo de la Garza &
Louis DeSipio, New Dimensions of Latino Participation, TOMAS RIVERA POL'Y INST.
SYMP. 1, 4 (2006), available at http://trpi.org/wp-content/uploads/archives/dimensions.pdf
("The Hispanic vote is notable not only for its size, but also because it is 'persuadable'-
that is, not yet 'locked in' to either major political party.").
69. See, e.g., Zoltan Hajnal & Taeku Lee, Out of Line: Immigration and Party
Identification Among Latinos and Asian Americans, in TRANSFORMING POLITICS,
TRANSFORMING AMERICA 129, 138 (Taeku Lee et al., eds., 2006) (reporting large
percentages of Asians and Latinos who have no preference as between Republican,
Democrat, or Independent political parties); Lien et al., supra note 68, at 628-29
(reporting based on the 2001 pilot study of the National Asian American Political Survey
that 20% of Asian-Americans did not think of themselves in partisan terms and 18% were
either uncertain or refused to respond); de la Garza & DeSipio, supra note 68, at 5 (noting
that in 2004, between 11% and 14% of Latino voters were undecided, substantially greater
than for other groups).
70. See, e.g., Stephen P. Nicholson & Gary M. Segura, Issue Agendas and the Politics
of Latino Partisan Identification, in DIVERSITY IN DEMOCRACY: MINORITY
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Politicians puzzled over why the two groups-particularly the
increasingly prosperous Asians-were not joining the Republican
Party in greater numbers." One recurring observation was that in
general, Hispanic and Asian Americans were just not that politicized
or mobilized, having low rates of political participation even
controlling for voter eligibility.72
Fierce storms over immigration, however, have galvanized and
politicized immigrant Americans-most recently stirred by state
immigration investigation laws such as Arizona Senate Bill 1070 and
copycat legislation.73  The controversial state immigration
REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 51, 66 (Gary M. Segura & Shaun Bowler eds.,
2005) (reporting the belief among strategists that Latinos harbored a "latent affection for
the GOP's social agenda that consists of issues such as abortion and traditional family
values"); David Sarasohn, Editorial, A Monochromatic Party Woos a Changing America,
OREGONIAN, Aug. 29, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 18575666 (noting beliefs that Latino
and Asian voters should be "natural Republicans" because of "commitment to family and
education and work"); Dan Walters, LA Shows Way into Future for Rest of State,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 17, 1986, at Al (statement of Sen. Art Torres, noting that
"[b]oth Hispanics and Asians are very conservative on law-and-order issues" and Asians
have higher educational and economic levels, factors that might ostensibly incline them to
Republicans).
71. See, e.g., Leon Hadar, The GOP's Asian-American Fiasco, AM. CONSERVATIVE
(Nov. 9, 2012), available at http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-gops-
asian-american-fiascol (puzzling over why Asians are voting Democratic, though they tend
to be wealthier, involved in the private sector, and have other indicia of Republican
leanings); Sonia Verma, Fastest-Growing Immigrant Group Will Play Pivotal Role in
Determining Next U.S. President, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), June 21, 2012, available at
2012 WLNR 12937244 (discussing conservative attempts to woo prosperous Asians); see
also, e.g., ZOLTAN HAJNEL & TAEKU LEE, WHY AMERICANS DON'T JOIN THE PARTY:
IMMIGRATION, AND THE FAILURE (OF POLITICAL PARTIES) TO ENGAGE THE
ELECTORATE 146 (2011) (noting how attempts at prognostication were complicated by
questions of whether Asian and Latino Americans would "ally with the Democratic Party
on the basis of collective racial interests as African Americans have since the civil rights
era" or whether their affiliation would be channeled more by factors such as liberal and
conservative ideological beliefs and economic interests); Harold Meyerson, CA to GOP:
Adios, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2012, at A13 (offering answers to politicians puzzled over why
Asians and Latinos are backing Democrats in record numbers).
72. See, e.g., Lien et al., supra note 68, at 628-29 (reporting that 20% of Asian-
Americans did not think of themselves in partisan terms); Melissa R. Michelson, Meeting
the Challenge of Latino Voter Mobilization, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 85, 86
(2005) (noting low voter participation rates among Latinos and Asians); Sidney Verba et
al., Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States, 23 BRIT. J.
POL. SCI. 453, 460-61 (1993) (noting that Latinos had substantially less political
participation than non-Latino whites and less political participation than blacks).
73. See Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, 2010
Ariz. Sess. Laws 450, (codified in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. tits. 11, 13,
23, 28, 41 (2012), as amended by Act of Apr. 30, 2010, ch. 211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1070,
1073-78); see, e.g., KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN & TAEKU LEE, OPINIONS OF ASIAN
AMERICANS AND PACIFIC ISLANDERS: FEDERAL IMMIGRATION POLICY 3 (2013),
available at http://www.naasurvey.com/resources[Home/NAAS12-immigration-jan2Ol3.pdf
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investigation and surveillance laws sparked protests around the
nation over racial and ethnic targeting under the cover of immigration
enforcement and showdowns in the Supreme Court and lower
courts.74 While differing somewhat in the details, the laws generally
conscript state and local police as well as private citizens, businesses,
and basic service providers such as schools into immigration
enforcement." The laws generally require officers to check
(reporting on changes of Asian-American perspectives on immigration issues between
2008 and 2010); Miriam Jordan, Conservative Latinos Rethink Party Ties, WALL ST. J.,
May 3, 2010, at A6 (discussing how anger over Arizona Senate Bill 1070 and related laws
are pushing Latinos leftward). For an excellent overview of the provisions, see, for
example, Gabriel J. Chin et al., A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona Senate Bill
1070,25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47, 50-76 (2010).
74. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497-98 (2012) (adjudicating
United States government's preemption challenge to Arizona Senate Bill 1070). For other
controversies over state immigration legislation in the courts, see, for example, United
States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012); Hispanic Interest Coal. v. Bentley, 691
F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012); Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 691 F.3d
1250 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Alabama, 443 Fed. Appx. 411 (11th Cir. 2011);
Buquer v. Indianapolis, 797 F. Supp. 2d 905 (S.D. Ind. 2011); Utah Coal. of La Raza v.
Herbert, No. 2:11-CV-401 CW, 2011 WL 7143098 (D. Utah May 11, 2011); see also
Johnson & Hing, supra note 3, at 134-35 (2007) (discussing import of protest marches).
75. See, e.g., Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, No.
535, §§ 4-5, 12-18, 28, 2011 Ala. Acts 888, 906-08, 920 (codified as amended at ALA.
CODE § 31-13 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012)) (requiring schools to determine whether children
seeking to enroll are aliens or born outside the United States; citizenship verification by
officers during any stops; and criminalizing harboring and transporting aliens while
"recklessly disregard[ing]" alienage, among other provisions); Support Our Law
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450, (codified in
scattered sections of ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. tits. 11, 13, 23, 28, 41 (2012), as amended by
Act of Apr. 30, 2010, ch. 211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1070, 1073-78) (criminalizing
transportation of aliens in "reckless[] disregard[]" that the alien is unlawfully present;
requiring that "for any lawful stop, detention or arrest" by law enforcement officials
"where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in
the United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the
immigration status of the person" and other measures); Illegal Immigration Reform and
Enforcement Act of 2011, §§ 3, 5, 7, 8(b), 9(b)(1), 20, 2011 Ga. Laws 794, 796-804
(codified in scattered sections of GA. CODE ANN. tits. 13, 16, 17, 35, 36, 42, 45, 50 (2012))
(criminalizing giving undocumented aliens rides; deterring employment of potential
undocumented workers; and authorizing immigration status checks "during any
investigation of a criminal suspect by a peace officer, when such officer has probable cause
to believe that a suspect has committed a criminal violation" among other provisions); Act
of May 10, 2011, §§ 2-3, 5, 16-21, 24,2011 Ind. Acts 1926, 1926-27, 1953-69 (to be codified
in scattered sections of IND. CODE tits. 4, 5, 6, 22, 34, 35 (2012)) (requiring law
enforcement officers making a lawful stop, detention, or arrest to request verification of
citizenship or immigration status if there is reasonable suspicion to believe the individual
is an unlawfully present alien and deterring renting to or employing suspected unlawfully
present persons among other provisions); Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act of 2011,
ch. 21, §§ 3-4, 6, 8, 10-11, 2011 Utah Laws 261, 262-65 (codified in scattered sections of
UTAH CODE ANN. tits. 76-77) (requiring immigration status checks of public benefits
seekers; criminalizing transporting or harboring suspected undocumented aliens;
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immigration status during any stop, detention, or arrest-even
everyday traffic stops-if the officer reasonably suspects the person is
an illegal immigrant.76 Private citizens are deterred from interacting
with suspected illegal immigrants through state laws criminalizing
transporting or harboring someone in "reckless disregard" of
alienage.77 Under such laws, giving someone a neighborly ride or
renting a room becomes a risky endeavor-particularly when the
person has a particular appearance-that might later be called
"reckless disregard" of alienage.8
The laws have drawn fire for providing incentives to discriminate
based on racial or ethnic appearance as a proxy for suspected
undocumented status.79 Of course the laws do not formally call for
such discrimination. Rather, the laws call for investigation and
shunning based on suspected unlawful immigration status. The reality
is, however, that race, ethnicity, and language are frequently used as a
mandating that officers conducting any lawful stop, detention, or arrest to verify
immigration status if documents indicating immigration status are not supplied; and
providing for warrantless arrests based on reasonable cause to suspect someone is an
unlawful alien).
76. See Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act §§ 5, 12;
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act §§ 2(A)-(B) (Ariz.); Act of
May 10, 2011 §§ 2-3 (Ind.); Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act of 2011 §§ 3, 6 (Utah);
cf Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011 §§ 8-9 (Ga.) (forbidding
prohibitions on law enforcement exchanging immigration status information and
authorizing immigration status checks "during any investigation of a criminal suspect by a
peace officer, when such officer has probable cause to believe that a suspect has
committed a criminal violation").
77. See, e.g., Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act § 13(4)
(criminalizing "[h]arbor[ing] an alien unlawfully present in the United States by entering
into a rental agreement . . . with an alien to provide accommodations, if the person knows
or recklessly disregards the fact that the alien is unlawfully present in the United States");
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act § 6 (Ariz.) (criminalizing
transportation of aliens in "reckless[] disregard" that the alien is unlawfully present); Act
of May 10, 2011 § 24 (Ind.) (criminalizing transporting or attempting to transport an alien
or harboring an alien knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the alien has come
to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law); Illegal Immigration
Enforcement Act of 2011 § 10 (Utah) (criminalizing transportation, moving or attempting
to move, or harboring an alien for commercial advantage or private financial knowing or
in reckless disregard of the fact that the alien is unlawfully present).
78. See, e.g., Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act § 13(4)
(criminalizing entering into a rental agreement with someone in reckless disregard of
alienage); cf Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011 § 7(d) (Ga.)
(broadly defining harboring to mean "any conduct that tends to substantially help an
illegal alien to remain in the United States" with exclusions for such humanitarian or
emergency situations such as services to infants, children, or crime victims).
79. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Immigration Ruling Leaves Issues Unresolved, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 2012, at A14 (discussing protests over state laws raising specter of targeting of
people perceived as foreign and continuing fears among Latinos because the Supreme
Court's decision in Arizona v. United States left the racial profiling issue unresolved).
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proxy for such unlawful status. 0 The state laws typically provide that
officials may not consider race, color, or national origin "except to the
extent permitted by the United States or [state] Constitution."" The
crucial wiggle words in these disclaimers are "except to the extent
permitted" under the Constitution. In 1975, the Supreme Court held
in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce8 that race can be a relevant-
albeit not sole-factor for establishing reasonable suspicion of
alienage."
Brignoni-Ponce held that "[t]he likelihood that any given person
of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican
appearance a relevant factor" though it cannot be a sole factor for
reasonable suspicion to stop someone.84 The Ninth Circuit has tried to
rein back Brignoni-Ponce in light of the fact that the proportion of
Hispanics has grown so much that Hispanic appearance is not
sufficiently predictive of alien status, at least in areas with Hispanic
majorities. Even in the Ninth Circuit, however, race remains a
relevant factor for suspicion of alienage in areas with a lower
concentration of Hispanics.86 Moreover, the Supreme Court has never
ratified the Ninth Circuit's cutback, and thus Brignoni-Ponce's
holding on racial relevance remains controlling. Indeed, in Arizona v.
United States," the Court left standing state immigration investigation
laws that have sparked fears over racial profiling pending further
clarification and adjudication by the lower courts.
80. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 63, at 16 & nn.93-95 (2009) (discussing cases where
law enforcement targeted Asian Americans and Hispanic Americans as suspected
unlawful aliens).
81. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509(C) (West Supp. 2012); see also, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 31-13-12(c) (LexisNexis 2011) ("A law enforcement officer may not
consider race, color, or national origin in implementing the requirements of this section
except to the extent permitted by the United States Constitution or the Constitution of
Alabama of 1901."); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-100(d) (2013) ("A peace officer shall not
consider race, color, or national origin in implementing the requirements of this Code
section except to the extent permitted by the Constitutions of Georgia and of the United
States."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-1003(5) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012) ("A law enforcement
officer may not consider race, color, or national origin in implementing this section, except
to the extent permitted by the constitutions of the United States and this state.").
82. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
83. Id. at 886-87.
84. Id.; see also Gabriel J. Chin & Kevin R. Johnson, Profiling's Enabler: High Court
Ruling Underpins Arizona Immigration Law, WASH. POST, July 13, 2010, at A15
(critiquing the Brignoni-Ponce decision and its consequences).
85. See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000) (en
banc).
86. See United States v. Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 936 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2006).
87. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
88. See id. at 2509.
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Recent proposals to limit birthright citizenship have further
underscored the linked fate of immigrants and immigrant Americans.
The proposals aim to overrule longstanding Supreme Court
precedent and rewrite the Constitution to deny citizenship to native-
born people whose parents were noncitizens."9 Proponents even argue
that American-born children of many lawfully-present noncitizens
should not be birthright citizens.9o Legislative proposals aim to
exclude, for example, children of lawfully present parents on
temporary visas.91 Proponents would exclude from the purview of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause, for example, first-
generation Americans born of people who lawfully immigrated to
America to attend school, or who are lawfully present on work visas.'
The broad scope of the attack shows the enduring wisdom behind
Martin Niem6ller's poem, which begins: "First they came for the
[vilified group] and I did not speak out / Because I was not a [member
of the vilified group]." 93 The poem ends: "Then they came for me-
and there was no one left to speak for me." 94 The attempt to constrict
birthright citizenship starkly shows that even American-born citizens
may not always be secure in their belonging.
A stronger sense of linked fate across legal status lines may even
shift views on controversial immigration issues such as the
legalization/amnesty debate. For example, before the passage of
controversial Arizona Senate Bill 1070 and copycat state immigration
legislation beginning in 2010, far fewer Asian Americans supported
paths to citizenship for undocumented people than in 2012.95 A 2008
survey of Asian Americans revealed that 46% opposed paths to
citizenship for those who had entered the country illegally while only
89. See, e.g., Julia Preston, State Lawmakers Outline Plans to End Birthright
Citizenship, Drawing Outcry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2011, at A16.
90. See, e.g., John C. Eastman, From Feudalism to Consent: Rethinking Birthright
Citizenship, THE HERITAGE FOUND., 2, 5 (Mar. 30, 2006), http://www.heritage.org
/research/reports/2006/03/from-feudalism-to-consent-rethinking-birthright-citizenship
(arguing children of even lawfully present foreign nationals should not be citizens).
91. See, e.g., MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RES. SERV. RL 33079, BIRTHRIGHT
CITIZENSHIP UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT OF PERSONS BORN IN THE UNITED
STATES TO ALIEN PARENTS 9-14 (2010) (summarizing national proposals); Preston, supra
note 89, at A16 (summarizing state legislative proposals); Eastman, supra note 90, at 5
(suggesting that children of even lawfully present foreign nationals are not fully "subject
to the jurisdiction" of the United States).
92. Steve Chapman, A Birthright, and a Mess of Pottage: Deny Citizenship to
American-Born Babies?, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 16, 2011, at 19.
93. Martin Niemoller, First They Came for the Jews, in HOLOCAUST POETRY 9 (Hilda
Schiff ed., 1995).
94. Id.
95. See RAMAKRISHNAN & LEE, supra note 73, at 3.
97
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about 33% were in support."6 By 2012, however, a majority of Asian
Americans supported paths to legalization (58%) while only 26%
were opposed.97
The intent of the state "attrition-through-enforcement" laws and
birthright citizenship-stripping proposals was to strike fear in
suspected undocumented immigrants and potential sympathizers.9 8
The laws may have backfired, however, by instead striking fear in
conservative leaders as the immigration controversies drove crucial
voting demographic groups to support the opposing party in record
numbers. 99 Waves of anti-immigrant sentiment with spillover harms to
people perceived as foreign have pushed Asian and Hispanic
Americans increasingly leftward."00 In the latest election, President
Obama and the Democratic Party won a record percentage of the
Asian and Hispanic votes.o' A record-breaking 12.5 million Hispanics
voted, and the vast majority-71%-supported President Obama,
helping him win battleground states such as Florida, Virginia, and
Colorado.102 While fewer Asians voted, an even larger percentage
supported President Obama (73%), and the relatively more affluent
Asian community offered another kind of impact-money.'0 3
Dismayed Republican leaders and strategists are trying to soften the
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Fan, supra note 18, at 1281 (quoting another sponsor of the bill, Arizona
State representative John Kavanagh, as saying "it's about creating so much fear they will
leave on their own"); id. (quoting Alabama State representative Micky Hammon, a co-
sponsor of Ala. H.B. 56, explaining that the goal was to make illegal aliens' lives "difficult
and they will deport themselves").
99. See, e.g., CBS MORNING NEWS, Interview by Anne-Marie Green and Susan
McGinnis with John McCain, U.S. Senator, Bob Menendez, U.S. Senator, Bob Corker,
U.S. Senator, and Paul Ryan, U.S. Representative, Immigration Overhaul (CBS television
broadcast Jan. 28, 2013), available at 2013 WLNR 2169140 [hereinafter Green Interview]
(statement of Sen. John McCain) ("We are losing dramatically the Hispanic vote, which
we think should be ours for a variety of reasons, and we got to understand that."); Crystal
Wright, RNC's Minority Outreach Plan: More of the Same, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2013,
available at 2013 WLNR 2463172 (arguing the Republican defeat shows the need for
greater outreach to Asians, blacks, and Hispanics).
100. See, e.g., RAMAKRISHNAN & LEE, supra note 73, at 3 (reporting on changes of
Asian American perspectives on immigration issues between 2008 and 2010); Jordan,
supra note 73, at A6 (discussing how anger over Arizona Senate Bill 1070 and related laws
are pushing Latinos leftward); Taeku Lee & Karthick Ramakrishnan, Turning Blue, L.A.
TIMEs, Nov. 23, 2012, at A31 (discussing how strong leftward turn of Asian Americans
caught the nation by surprise and explaining reasons for move, including heated
immigration rhetoric).
101. Constable & Lazo, supra note 8, at Cl, C6.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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party stance on immigration to avoid further alienation of these
crucial demographic groups.104
Now immigration reform looms as a national priority-with a
twist. Today, comprehensive immigration reform is spurred by the
politics of inclusion rather than exclusion and fueled by the need to
bow to-rather than combat-demographic change. Immigration
overhaul is pitched as a promise to Asian and Hispanic Americans
who flexed their political muscle in the latest presidential election."os
Thus far, much of the early debate has been about opening routes to
legalization of status for undocumented immigrants living in the
United States, also dubbed "amnesty."' Paths to legal status would
transform the lives of more than ten million undocumented people in
the United States, as it did for more than a million undocumented
people in the last grant of amnesty in 1986.107 The
legalization/amnesty debate also opens the door to fierce fights over
rewarding and incentivizing transgressing immigration laws.10
Overlooked in all the controversy is that amnesty alone does not
address a central concern that has rallied voting Asian and Hispanic
Americans and nonvoting Americans-in-waiting alike. What has
galvanized rising voting demographic groups are the cycles of
suspicion, surveillance, and branding as potential criminals that sweep
104. See, e.g., Green Interview, supra note 99, at 2 (discussing how Republicans need
immigration reform "to win over Hispanic voters"); Rich Lowry, Wooing Latin Voters:
The GOP's Amnesty Failure, OREGONIAN, Nov. 17, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR
24532365 (noting that after "getting killed almost 3-to-1 among Latin voters" the "GOP
elites rushed to embrace an amnesty for illegal immigrants").
105. Constable & Lazo, supra note 8, at Cl.
106. See, e.g., Karen Tumulty, Missteps of 1986 Overhaul Haunt Immigration Debate,
WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2013, at Al, A12 (discussing debate and concerns over repeating
problems with the 1986 amnesty conferred by the Immigration Reform and Control Act);
Bill Keller, Op-Ed., Selling Amnesty, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com
/2013/02/04/opinion/keller-selling-amnesty.html?pagewanted=all (discussing debate);
Rachel Weiner, How Immigration Reform Failed, Over and Over, WASH. POST BLOG,
THE FIX (Jan. 30, 2013, 1:15 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
fix/wp/2013/01/30/how-immigration-reform-failed-over-and-over/ (discussing recurrent
storms over amnesty and the most recent immigration reform efforts).
107. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, Throngs ofAliens Seeking Amnesty as Deadline Nears,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1988, at Al, A27 (describing how more than 1.2 million have applied
for general amnesty and another 400,000 have applied under more generous provisions for
agricultural workers with tens of thousands more rushing to apply).
108. See, e.g., Swarns, Failed Amnesty Legislation of 1986 Haunts the Current
Immigration Bills in Congress, supra note 7, at A20 (discussing controversies and
arguments paralleling legalization debate to 1986 amnesty controversies); Keller, supra
note 106 (discussing concerns over coddling criminals and controversies over the 1986
amnesty, which was followed by a massive influx of unauthorized immigration).
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beyond undocumented people to Americans perceived as foreign. 09
These cycles of targeting and branding are a feature of the structure
of immigration criminalization, shaped by the ambition of the
immigration criminalization strategy from its earliest days."o
B. Immigration Criminalization's Structure and Historical Ambition
1. The Relationship Between Criminalization Breadth and Targeting
Discretion
Overbreadth in immigration investigation stems from
overbreadth in the structure of immigration criminalization.
Discretion to investigate is shaped by the structure of the criminal
laws authorizing the intrusion."' The broader the structure and
standards, the greater the discretion.'12 When the gravamen of
criminality hinges primarily on a status feature such as immigration
status that predominantly involves certain racial groups, all members
of the group bear the greater burden of investigation."3
This is the logic and result of United States v. Brignoni-Ponce on
racial relevance.1 14 Brignoni-Ponce noted that, according to
government estimates, 85% of undocumented aliens were from
Mexico and that between 80% and 92% of arrested deportable aliens
were from Mexico."'s The Court also referred to 1970 census figures
indicating that among the persons of Mexican origin registered as
aliens in the border states of California, Texas, Arizona, and New
Mexico, between 8.5% and 20.4% were registered aliens."6 When
alienage is a crucial feature of criminalization, people of the
predominant race or ethnicity of aliens bear the greater burden of
investigation-rousing the wave of protests and concerns from
immigrant Americans as well as immigrants over targeting.
109. See supra notes 73-104 and accompanying text.
110. See infra Part II.B.2 for a history and analysis.
111. See, e.g., Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation,
and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 759, 770-71 (1999) (discussing how
Congress can give law enforcers greater discretion and freedom to target groups for
community condemnation through broad laws that eschew specificity).
112. See id.
113. Cf RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 159 (1997) (discussing
how people of color pay a greater "racial tax" in criminal investigation).
114. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975) (discussing the
relationship between increased criminal scrutiny and identification as part of a specific
racial group).
115. Id. at 879 & n.5.
116. Id. at 886 n.12.
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2. The Historical Roots of Immigration Criminalization
The problems of the present have roots in the past and a history
that still shapes the structure of immigration criminalization laws
today. Controversy surrounded the use of immigration
criminalization to brand and control undesirables of particular
national origins from the nation's earliest days. The 1798 Alien
Friends Act"' sparked fierce condemnation for adopting such a
strategy. The legislation was unusual and controversial in an age
when the national government scarcely regulated immigration
because the nation needed immigrants to work the vast land."' The
Act would later pass into American history as part of the infamous
Alien and Sedition Acts that were widely denounced as an
embarrassment of governmental overreaching.1 1 9 The Alien Friends
Act was pushed through by Federalists attempting to silence domestic
critics and purge the nation of foreign ideas, particularly those of the
French, who were going through the social and intellectual tumult of
the French Revolution.120
The Alien Friends Act was passed a few days before the Alien
Enemies Act.121 Both pieces of legislation were aimed at the French,
although they were formally framed in generally applicable
language.122 Anti-French Federalists whipped up popular sentiment,
warning of pillage, rape, and murder by "hard outlandish sans-culotte
Frenchmen." 123 Federalists accused their Republican political rivals of
being "Frenchmen in all their feelings and wishes" and claimed
Thomas Jefferson was a French tool-"the very child of modern
illumination, the foe of man, and the enemy of his country." 124 The
117. See Act Concerning Aliens, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired 1800).
118. See, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (2006) (noting unusual
nature of the Act and general attitudes toward immigration at the time).
119. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-98 (1964) (discussing the
controversy over and criticism of the Act); see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
2492, 2511-12 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting criticism
on First Amendment grounds of the Sedition Act and arguments that the Alien Friends
Act exceeded federal power and transgressed into the domain of state protections for
aliens in their jurisdiction).
120. See James Morton Smith, The Enforcement of the Alien Friends Act of 1798, 41
MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 85, 85-87 (1954).
121. See 1 Stat. at 570 (enacted June 25, 1798); An Act Respecting Alien Enemies, ch.
66, 1 Stat. 577, 577 (1798) (enacted July 6, 1798) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-
24 (2006)).
122. See KANSTROOM, supra note 66, at 55.
123. PHILIP PERLMUTTER, LEGACY OF HATE: A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHNIC,
RELIGIOUS, AND RACIAL PREJUDICE IN AMERICA 55 (1999).
124. Id. at 55-56.
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Federalists sought to suppress the "French apostles of Sedition" and
also strike at another ethnic bogeyman, "hordes of wild Irishmen"
then struggling for liberation from the English. 125 The aim of the anti-
alien acts was to "strike terror among these people." 126
The more controversial Alien Friends Act applied in peace or
war and permitted the President to "order all such aliens as he shall
judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or shall
have reasonable grounds to suspect are concerned in any treasonable
or secret machinations against the government thereof, to depart out
of the territory of the United States."l 27 To further brand the vilified
groups as criminal, the Alien Friends Act contained the following
criminalization language:
And in case any alien, so ordered to depart, shall be found at
large within the United States after the time limited in such
order for his departure, and not having obtained a license from
the President to reside therein, or having obtained such license
shall not have conformed thereto, every such alien shall, on
conviction thereof, be imprisoned for a term not exceeding
three years, and shall never be admitted to become a citizen of
the United States....
And be it further enacted, That it shall be lawful for the
President of the United States, whenever he may deem it
necessary for the public safety, to order to be removed out of
the territory thereof, any alien who may or shall be in prison in
pursuance of this act; and to cause to be arrested and sent out
of the United States such of those aliens as shall have been
ordered to depart therefrom and shall not have obtained a
license as aforesaid, in all cases where, in the opinion of the
President, the public safety requires a speedy removal. And if
any alien so removed or sent out of the United States by the
President shall voluntarily return thereto, unless by permission
of the President of the United States, such alien on conviction
125. HOWARD ZINN, PASSIONATE DECLARATIONS: ESSAYS ON WAR AND JUSTICE
184 (2003).
126. LEONARD W. LEVY, SEASONED JUDGMENTS: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION,
RIGHTS, AND HISTORY 340 (1995).
127. An Act Concerning Aliens, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, 570-71 (1798) (expired 1800).
Conversely, the Alien Enemies Act, parts of which remain in force today, gave the
President power to arrest and remove natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of a hostile
nation in times of war or imminent invasion. An Act Respecting Alien Enemies, ch. 66, 1
Stat. 577 (1798) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (2006)).
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thereof, shall be imprisoned so long as, in the opinion of the
President, the public safety may require.128
These criminalization provisions gave Federalist President John
Adams vast discretion to determine which "alien" or group of aliens
to label "dangerous" and wide discretion to deport or incarcerate.
The history surrounding the enactment of the law shows that the
targets were the bogeymen of the times-the French and the Irish. 129
The breadth of the legal standards gave the executive discretion and
flexibility, however, to pursue whatever groups the shifting tides of
popular passions and politics deemed undesirable.
The law-termed "a sacrifice of the first-born offspring of
freedom"-roused strong controversy and opposition across the
country." Benjamin Franklin's grandson, Benjamin Franklin Bache,
publisher of the Jeffersonian Philadelphia Aurora, deplored that "[a]
numerous body of people are to be subjected to ruin at the arbitrary
mandate of the President."13' Then Vice President Thomas Jefferson,
termed the act "a most detestable thing."132 Jefferson secretly
authored the Kentucky Resolution of 1789, which, among other
things, protested that the federal government exceeded its delegated
power to punish constitutionally-specified offenses such as treason,
counterfeiting, and offenses against the law of nations.133 The idea
that the federal government may only proscribe the handful of
offenses spelled out in the Constitution has not won the day.134 But
the fundamental concern that Jefferson was expressing-
overreaching unconstrained power-captures one of the major
problems with the structure of the nation's first immigration
criminalization law.
128. An Act Concerning Aliens, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, 571 (1798) (expired 1800)
(emphasis added).
129. See ZINN, supra note 125, at 184.
130. KANSTROOM, supra note 66, at 56.
131. JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS
AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 53 (1956).
132. KANSTROOM, supra note 66, at 57.
133. THOMAS JEFFERSON, KENTUCKY RESOLUTION OF 1789, reprinted in 30 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1 JAN. 1798 TO 31 JAN. 1799, at 529, 550 (Barbara B.
Oberg et al. eds., 2003).
134. For critiques of the explosion of federal criminalization, see, for example, Sara
Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to
Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 773-75 (2005); Erik Luna, The
Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 725-26 (2005); William J.
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 509-12, 529-39
(2001).
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The Alien Friends Act expired two years after its enactment on
June 25, 1798." Thirteen years later John Adams wrote that he had
not applied the controversial law "in a single instance."136 This
attempt at self-rehabilitation was technically correct because
President Adams did not have to initiate proceedings under the law in
order to achieve the intended result.13 7 The French got the message by
the law's very existence. As Jefferson put it, "the threatening
appearances from the Alien bills have so alarmed the French who are
among us, that they are going off."138 Even though the law was
formally national origin or ethnicity-neutral and targeted at the
"alien," everyone knew the law's main target-and how the law's
broad design conferred the discretion to go after the vilified group.13 9
A later immigration criminalization law did not bother at being
subtle. It was explicitly targeted at the new racial and cultural
undesirables of the period-the Chinese. In the late 1800s, the nation
was reeling from a severe recession.140 Anti-Chinese campaigners
argued that work "would be plenty" if not for the Chinese degrading
labor, displacing white workers, serving as "voluntary slaves," and
subsisting and living cheaply "like vermin."14 In a frequent tactic of
fierce anti-immigrant politics, the Chinese were painted as a criminal
contagion, offenders dumped by China into the United States who
gambled, sold women, thieved, and engaged in violence.142 In this
atmosphere of anti-Chinese hatred, Congress enacted the Geary Act
in 1892, which provided in part:
135. See Smith, supra note 120, at 86.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 86-87 (explaining that the Act had the effect of intimidating foreigners
into leaving the United States).
138. Id. at 87.
139. See id. at 86-87 (discussing the widely understood intent of the laws).
140. For a history, see, for example, Fan, supra note 66, at 911-22.
141. COMM. OF THE SENATE OF CAL., CHINESE IMMIGRATION: THE SOCIAL, MORAL,
AND POLITICAL EFFECT OF CHINESE IMMIGRATION 7, 41 (1877), available at http:/
/content.cdlib.orglark:/13030/hb538nb0d6/?order=2 (characterizing Chinese as "voluntary
slaves" and akin to "vermin"); Congressman Horace Davis, Chinese Immigration: Speech
of Hon. Horace Davis, of California, in the House of Representatives 3 (June 8, 1878),
available at http://content.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb7h4nb2lq/?order=3&brand=calisphere
(arguing work "would be plenty" if not for the Chinese); Senator Aaron A. Sargent,
Speech on Immigration of Chinese in the United States Senate 1, 6 (May 2, 1876),
available at www.oac.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb0j49n3vp/?order=2&brand=oac4 (decrying
Chinese).
142. See, e.g., COMM. OF THE SENATE OF CAL., supra note 141, at 20-31; Gen. A.M.
Winn, President, Valedictory Address to the Mechanics' State Council of California 4-5
(Jan. 11, 1871), available at http://www.0ac.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb2779n54f/?order=
2&brand=oac4.
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[A]ny such Chinese person or person of Chinese descent
convicted and adjudged to be not lawfully entitled to be or
remain in the United States shall be imprisoned at hard labor
for a period of not exceeding one year and thereafter removed
from the United States ....
Rather than refer euphemistically to the "alien," the law openly
specified its target. Criminalization was based on being of Chinese
descent and unauthorized to be in the United States.
Not only were the Chinese singled out for criminalization, they
were subject to a summary criminal process. The punishment could
be inflicted on a finding by a commissioner, judge, or justice without
grand jury indictment or trial by jury.1" Ultimately, the Supreme
Court invalidated this blatant law of racial targeting on procedural
grounds.145 In Wong Wing v. United Statesl46 the Court ruled that a
criminal trial was required before delivering infamous punishment-
even if merely upon "aliens whose race or habits render them
undesirable as citizens." 147 For nearly two decades after Wong Wing's
intervention, the national government mainly regulated immigration
as a civil matter. 48
By 1918, however, the United States had entered World War I
and was again in the grips of fear of alien enemies. In this climate of
anxiety, Congress passed an act which made it a crime for previously
deported aliens to "creturn to or enter the United States or attempt to
return to or to enter the United States."149 The act also expanded the
basis for inadmissibility and deportation.' While formally race and
ethnicity-neutral, the concerns behind the immigration
criminalization law are suggested by other immigration laws passed
around this period. In the Emergency Immigration Act of 1921,
Congress, for the first time in the nation's history, set immigration
quotas to preserve the racial and ethnic balance against inflows of
143. Geary Act of 1892, ch. 60, § 4, 27 Stat. 25 (repealed 1943).
144. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (analyzing procedure).
145. Id. at 237.
146. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
147. Id. at 237.
148. See Mae M. Ngai, The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restrictions
and Deportation Policy in the United States, 1921-1965, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 69, 76
(2003) (discussing a change in the 1920s from the "previous immigration policy").
149. Act of Oct. 16, 1918, ch. 186, § 3, 40 Stat. 1012 (repealed 1952).
150. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (prohibiting immigration of aliens
from specific geographic locations and aliens with certain undesirable characteristics). For
a discussion, see, for example, Ngai, supra note 148, at 71.
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ethnicities and races deemed undesirable.'5 The 1921 act impeded the
arrival of whites perceived to be more "ethnic," such as Italians, who
found the restrictions a humiliating denigration.152 The Immigration
Act of 1924, also known as the National Origins Act, elaborated on
the use of racial quotas to preserve the Northern European ideal for
the nation, particularly impeding Asian (including Japanese) and
Eastern European immigration.'
By 1929, Congress decided to augment the toughening civil
regime with criminal penalties. Around the same time, the ethnic
target at the thicket of civil deportation and criminal laws was shifting
to Mexicans-though at the time, Mexicans were not subject to the
national origin quotas. 5 4 Nonetheless, the United States-Mexico
border was hardening, as the newly created Border Patrol began
aggressively apprehending and deporting "irregular" Mexican
entrants who did not meet literacy or other requirements."' The Act
of March 4, 1929 defined two forms of immigration crimes.5 6 The first
was unlawful entry by an alien into the United States, a misdemeanor
punishable by up to a year in prison.'"' The second was entry or
attempted entry by a previously deported alien, a felony punishable
by up to two years in prison.5 8
The verb "entry" created the atmosphere of a conduct crime.
But, as in the past, criminality turned on unauthorized alien status,
the proxy for the racial or ethnic bogeyman of the day. During anti-
immigrant furor directed primarily against the Chinese, Justice
Brewer warned presciently, "It is true this statute is directed only
against the obnoxious Chinese, but if the power exists, who shall say it
will not be exercised to-morrow against other classes and other
people?"5 9 By the 1930s, Mexicans were becoming the "prototypical
151. See Act to Limit the Immigration of Aliens into the United States, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5
(1921); see, e.g., Mae M. Ngai, The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A
Re-examination of the Immigration Act of 1924, 86 J. AM. HIST. 67, 68 n.4 (1999).
152. See Constantine Panunzio, Italian Americans, Fascism, and the War, YALE REV.,
Sept. 1941, at 771, 774-75.
153. MOTOMURA, supra note 118, at 126-30 (discussing the intent and effect of the
Immigration Act of 1924); see Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924)
(repealed 1952).
154. See Ngai, supra note 148, at 84-85.
155. Id. at 85-86.
156. Act of Mar. 4, 1929, ch. 690, 45 Stat. 1551.
157. Id. § 2.
158. Id. § 1.
159. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 743 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
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illegal alien" as "stereotypes about Mexicans as criminals" were
taking root in the national consciousness.1 6
This history of vast discretion to target groups deemed
undesirable has shaped the two main immigration criminalization
provisions that today account for the vast majority of the largest
category of federal case prosecuted. Today, the criminalization of
illegal entry by aliens is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1325, and the penal
provisions on previously deported aliens are codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326.161 Section 1325(a) criminalizes:
Any alien who (1) enters or attempts to enter the United States
at any time or place other than as designated by immigration
officers, or (2) eludes examination or inspection by immigration
officers, or (3) attempts to enter or obtains entry to the United
States by a willfully false or misleading representation or the
willful concealment of a material fact .... 162
Immigration criminalization has long pushed the distinction
between the criminalization of status and conduct. 6  The conduct
verbs focused on (1) entering or attempting entry; (2) eluding
inspection; and (3) attempting to enter through misrepresentation or
concealment that creates the atmosphere of a conduct crime. The
price of couching the crime in conduct rather than the gravamen of
unlawful status driving the conduct was that prosecutors had the
additional pesky task of establishing the conduct, for example entry,
in addition to alienage.'"M Of course, the key element that makes the
conduct criminal is status-alienage.
160. MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA 71 (2004); see also Kevin R. Johnson, The New Nativism: Something
Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE
NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 165, 171
(Juan F. Perea ed., 1997).
161. Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. 82-414, 66 Stat. 229 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of Title 8 of the United States Code).
162. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2012).
163. See supra notes 114-48 and accompanying text.
164. Indeed, a whole jurisprudence of how to prove or infer entry has arisen. See, e.g.,
United States v. DiSantilli, 615 F.2d 128, 137 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that entry or reentry
is committed "when [the alien's] presence is first noted by the immigration authorities"
and entry is not a continuing offense if it occurs through a port of entry); United States v.
Rincon-Jim6nez, 595 F.2d 1192, 1194 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that the crime of illegal entry
under 8 U.S.C. § 1325 completes upon entry and is not a continuing offense). But see, e.g.,
United States v. Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d 277, 282 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the addition
of the "found in" language in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) makes entry a "continuing offense until at
least such time as the alien is located").
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In 1952, an alternative formulation of criminality arose: being a
previously deported alien "found in the United States" without
previous authorization from the Attorney General. 65 With the
addition of the "found in" language, the line between status and
conduct crime is vanishingly thin. Section 1326 now provides that the
following suffices to constitute a felony:
any alien who-
(1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed
or has departed the United States while an order of exclusion,
deportation, or removal is outstanding, and thereafter
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the
United States, unless
(A) prior to his reembarkation at a place outside the
United States or his application for admission from foreign
contiguous territory, the Attorney General has expressly
consented to such alien's reapplying for admission; or
(B) with respect to an alien previously denied admission
and removed, unless such alien shall establish that he was
not required to obtain such advance consent under this
chapter or any prior Act ... .166
Contrast the structure of contemporary immigration
criminalization law with the language from the Alien Friends Act of
1789 that Thomas Jefferson condemned and not even President
Adams could bring himself to enforce.167 The discretion to target the
undesirables of the day as criminals is wide because criminality turns
on the status as alien. The status as alien-and previous
deportation-in turn is strongly shaped by laws defining desirable
groups permitted to lawfully immigrate and undesirable groups shut
out. American history over the centuries has demonstrated that the
concept of alien is suffused with a history of controlling the
population of groups defined by race, ethnicity, and national origin.
Because criminal immigration status turns on alien status, which
historically has mapped to particular races, ethnicity, or national
165. United States v. Garcia, No. 6:08-cr-81-Orl-19GJK, 2008 WL 2856753, at *13
(M.D. Fla. July 22, 2008), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Palomino
Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2010).
166. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2012).
167. Compare An Act Concerning Aliens, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, 571 (1798) (expired 1800)
(the Alien Friends Act), with 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2012).
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origins, immigration criminalization has strongly raced consequences
in terms of the demographics of who is investigated and prosecuted.
C. Awakening to Preservation by Transformation
Today, immigration criminalization laws are formally race-
neutral. Yet, the historical ambition of ethnic and racial containment
through the use of crimmigration laws has been preserved though the
rationale has transformed. Rather than openly stating intent to target
racial and ethnic undesirables, the new justification is rendered
seemingly race-neutral in the muscular rhetoric of combating
illegality. This rhetorical transformation brings to mind Reva Siegel's
influential notion of preservation by transformation, which
illuminates how old ways of control, stratification, and subordination
are preserved while the justifications are transformed.168 As past
justifications become dated or repudiated, new ways to justify the
persistence of past strategies and structures emerge.169 We can see the
preservation of the ambitions of the past, even if they are no longer
nakedly stated, by tracing how they shape the structure of
contemporary practices and laws-and the resulting outcomes.
Formally race-neutral criminal laws can nonetheless concentrate
impact on different ethnic or racial groups. The impact in the
immigration prosecution context is pronounced. Figures 2 and 3 map
the tandem rise in the proportion of immigration prosecutions and
the numbers of Hispanic defendants around 1994. Immigration is by
far the most racially skewed category of federal prosecution-for
example, 89.5% of all immigration defendants in 2011 were Hispanic,
and 91.9% were non-white.170 In contrast, for drug trafficking-
another category with particularly pronounced racial
disproportionalities-the difference is not as extreme. In 2011, for
example, 46.6% of narcotics trafficking defendants were Hispanic,
25.5% were black, and 24.9% were white."'
168. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How "Color
Blindness" Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 77,
83, 111-12 (2000); Reva B. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The
Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113, 1119
(1997); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife-Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2119, 2178 (1996).
169. See Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 168, at 1118.
170. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
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Figure 2 shows the trajectory of two other oft-cited federal
criminal prosecution priorities-narcotics and white-collar crime
prosecutions by proportion of federal cases. The curves show how the
proportion of immigration prosecutions among federal cases has risen
since the 1990s while the proportion of white-collar crime and
narcotics prosecutions has declined. Note that declining proportions
of federal prosecutions is distinct from the rise in numbers of
prosecutions across categories over time. The chart is about relative
proportions to show the shift in focus. The graphs are not meant to
imply causation. Rather, the graphs map how these three oft-invoked
federal prosecution priorities compare in terms of proportion of
federal cases over the last decades.
FIG. 2: THE RISE OF IMMIGRATION PROSECUTIONS
BY PROPORTION OF FEDERAL CASES
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Figure 3 captures the ethnic inversion point in 1997 when the
twin trends of declining numbers of white defendants and increasing
Hispanic defendants intersected. Thereafter, Hispanics became the
largest category by race or ethnicity prosecuted in the federal criminal
justice system. By 1998, Hispanics constituted 37% of all federal
defendants while whites constituted 32% of the federal defendant
population.17 2 In contrast, Hispanics constituted a minority of about
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11.7% of the United States population in 1999.173 Controversies over
racial and ethnic profiling in immigration enforcement must be
construed in light of the stark portrait of the profile of the
predominant federal defendant today.
FIGURE 3: THE CHANGING RACIAL AND ETHNIC
PROFILE OF FEDERAL DEFENDANTS
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III. BLOAT-BUSTING: FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE FEDERAL
CRIMMIGRATION COMPLEX
Egalitarians are frustrated. 174 They proffer poignant stories about
a permanent underclass of people lacking legal status living in
America. 175 They make paths to legalization a centerpiece of their
battles only to watch as the proposals, also dubbed amnesty, become
173. ROBERTO R. RAMIREZ, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS: THE HISPANIC POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1999), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/p20-527.pdf.
174. See, e.g., Michael A. Olivas, Dreams Deferred: Deferred Action, Prosecutorial
Discretion, and the Vexing Case(s) of DREAM Act Students, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J.
463, 521 (2012) (detailing mounting frustrations of immigration reform advocates and
hopeful unauthorized immigrants).
175. See, e.g., Ren6 Galindo, Embodying the Gap Between National Inclusion and
Exclusion: The "Testimonios" of Three Undocumented Students at a 2007 Congressional
Hearing, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 377, 378, 384-88 (2011) (detailing narratives of
undocumented students).
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red flags for opponents rather than rallying points.176 Why is the other
side not similarly moved? Are they impervious to the power of
narrative?"' Is narrative just a lefty egalitarian thing?178 Here, cultural
cognition plays an important role in trying to move past the
communication impasse and resultant frustration and stalemate. It is
not that the technique of narrative does not work. Many studies show
that narrative is a powerful motivator, particularly where affective
reactions can help precipitate action."' But the narrative has to bring
out issues that resonate with hierarchs as well as egalitarians.s 0
The search for common ground as an entryway for progress
rather than stalemate on immigration reform may also illuminate
neglected issues sorely in need of reform. Beyond the
176. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 106 (discussing political controversies over alleged
amnesty); Weiner, supra note 106 (detailing repeated failed attempts to carve paths to
legalization).
177. On the power of narrative in understanding the law, see, for example, Mario L.
Barnes, Black Women's Stories and the Criminal Law: Restating the Power of Narrative, 39
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 941, 951 (2006) (challenging harmful identity constructions through
narrative); Derrick Bell, The Power of Narrative, 23 LEGAL STUD. F. 315, 315-17 (1999)
(detailing science fiction narrative and its impact on racial legal discourse); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607, 614-16 (1994) (revealing the
substantial social costs of exclusionary policies through narrative); Robert L. Hayman &
Nancy Levit, The Tales of White Folk: Doctrine, Narrative, and the Reconstruction of
Racial Reality, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 377, 421-32 (1996) (presenting storytelling as a way to
explore truths that are more ambiguous than traditional legal dialogue); Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, Teaching Employment Discrimination, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 755, 760-62
(2010) (explaining the power of narrative in the courtroom and in teaching); Steven L.
Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative
Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2227-28 (1989) (arguing that narrative fits the mind's
way of making sense of its experiences).
178. Consider the prevalence of critical race and minority protection perspectives
among prominent legal scholars deploying narrative. See supra note 177.
179. See, e.g., Melanie C. Green & Timothy C. Brock, In the Mind's Eye:
Transportation-Imagery Model of Narrative Persuasion, in NARRATIVE IMPACT: SOCIAL
AND COGNITIVE FOUNDATIONS 315, 315-33 (Melanie C. Green et al. eds., 2011)
(discussing mechanisms of narrative impact); Roger C. Schank & Tamara R. Berman, The
Pervasive Role of Stories in Knowledge and Action, in NARRATIVE IMPACT: SOCIAL AND
COGNITIVE FOUNDATIONS 287, 287-95 (Melanie C. Green et al. eds., 2011) (explaining
the impact of storytelling on motivation to action); Jenifer E. Kopfman et al., Affective and
Cognitive Reactions to Narrative Versus Statistical Evidence in Organ Donation Messages,
26 J. APPLIED COMM. RES. 279, 293-94 (1998) (finding that narratives produced greater
results on affective variables while statistics elicited greater results on cognitive-dependent
variables in organ donation campaign study); Paul Slovic, Numbed by Numbers, FOREIGN
POL'Y (Mar. 13, 2007), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2007/03/12/numbed
-by-numbers (collecting social psychological studies on how statistics may numb
compassion whereas an account of one suffering individual may motivate action).
180. See Kahan, supra note 33, at 145-48 (explaining how laws and policies that affirm
divergent worldviews through "expressive overdeterminism" can help ameliorate
intractable conflicts).
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legalization/amnesty debate, immigration criminalization and
incarceration overbreadth endanger values important to both
hierarchs and egalitarians. Narratives about waste-fiscal and
human-and the need for improved government discipline and
responsibility have the power to speak across lines.' As this Part
discusses, billions have been spent on immigration prosecution and
both criminal and civil incarceration, sweeping up many whose cases
could be more cost-effectively addressed. Indeed, wrestling with the
consequences of swollen spending, waste, and bloat have prompted
rare and powerful calls for reform from the front lines and across the
typical fault lines on law-and-order issues.
A. A Call for Reform from the Front Lines-and Across Fault Lines
Consider a moment on the front lines of federal criminal justice
in the Western District of Texas, one of the top five highest-volume
districts in the nation in terms of overall caseload.182 The sentencing
began like many others. The prosecutor and defense attorney stated
their names for the record.'83 Neither said much more. When offered
the opportunity to make his case for his client, the defense attorney
simply replied, "Judge, did you see the letters that were written by
him and his wife? That's all that I would have to add, your Honor.
He's been in custody for two months."'" The defendant actually had
been in custody for three months.85
Rather than merely stating the sentence and moving to the next
case in line, this time, Judge Sam Sparks halted the assembly line. The
case resembled many others he had seen in recent years-and that
was the problem. The judge could hold his silence no longer, saying
the following:
181. See supra note 46; infra Part III.C.
182. The top five federal districts by caseload are the Southern District of California,
the District of Arizona, the District of New Mexico and the Western and Southern
Districts of Texas. MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS PROGRAM: IMMIGRATION OFFENDERS IN THE
FEDERAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 2010, at 8 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content
/pub/pdf/iofjsl0.pdf.
183. Transcript of Sentencing Before the Hon. Sam Sparks at 2, United States v.
Ordones-Soto, No. 1:09CR 00590-SS (W.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2010).
184. Id. at 3.
185. See id. at 2, 4 (statement by Judge Sparks correctly noting the length in custody).
The time spent in custody matters because it offsets the additional time to be served-and
in some cases, whether the defendant gets time served or must do more time. Indeed,
because of his lack of prior criminal history and the nature of the offense, Ordones-Soto
was sentenced to time served with the standard year of supervised release. Id. at 4.
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What in the world is the U.S. Attorney doing spending over
$5,000 of taxpayer funds to prosecute this person? He has no
criminal record. He's got two birth dates that are recorded in
this country, [which] may or may not be typographical. He
has-well, I've already spent $4,500 to counties to keep him
jailed from November the 2nd. . . . It's just throwing up $5,000,
and that's if I haven't had any medical. That's if he hasn't had
any dental. That's just basic .... What's the reason he's
prosecuted? 186
The prosecutor stammered, "Your Honor, I don't think I could
provide you with the satis-."m1 8 The judge responded by ordering the
reasons in writing and underscoring: "[B]y the time y'all can process
somebody, we've spent three months in jail. That's $1,500 a month
just for food and water, and I'm tired of it."188
In a subsequent order, Judge Sparks explained his concerns,
exemplified in three recent immigration cases before him:
These three defendants-like many of the defendants
prosecuted [under] 8 U.S.C. § 1326 in the last six months-have
no significant criminal history, and the prosecuting Assistant
United States Attorney cannot state a reason that these three
defendants were prosecuted rather than simply removed from
the United States. The expense [of] these three defendants for
housing in county jails is in excess of $13,350 to the date of the
sentencing. In addition to those payments to county jail
facilities, there are the expenses in time and costs of the United
States Attorney's Office; of the U.S. Marshal's Service; of the
United States Probation Office; of the court personnel; of
appointed counsel and the Federal Public Defenders; of
interpreters; medical and dental expenses for those in custody;
transportation costs. Every judge in the Western District of
Texas is sentencing a substantial number of illegal aliens every
month. It appears the United States Attorney is not screening
these cases to eliminate those persons who need no federal
prosecution and should simply be returned to their own
country....
The expenses of prosecuting illegal entry and re-entry cases
(rather than deportation) on aliens without any significant
criminal record [are] simply mind boggling. The U.S.
Attorney's policy of prosecuting all aliens presents a cost to the
186. Id. at 3-4.
187. Id. at 4.
188. Id.
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American taxpayer at this time that is neither meritorious nor
reasonable.189
The U.S. Attorney's subsequent written reply to the judge began
by pointing out that courts "allow the government discretion to
decide which individuals to prosecute, which offenses to charge, and
what measure of punishment to seek."190 The exception to this wide
unquestioned discretion was for "extraordinary cases where it
appears the prosecutor is motivated by considerations clearly
contrary to the manifest public interest.""'1 The U.S. Attorney's
Office disagreed that these run-of-the-mill immigration cases were
such extraordinary cases manifestly contrary to the public interest.192
Nonetheless, the prosecutors explained that each defendant was
found by ICE agents while in custody on charges of driving while
intoxicated."' The reply defended the policy of going after
misdemeanants:
As part of the Southwest Border Initiative of the Department
of Justice ... the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western
District of Texas has expanded its prosecution of immigration
violations in recent years. This has included the prosecution of
large numbers of illegal entrants for misdemeanor offenses in
the border divisions, particularly as part of Operation
Streamline in the Del Rio Division starting in 2005. The office
has also prosecuted greater numbers of illegal reentry violations
in all divisions in the District, to include a wide spectrum of
violators, and not only the "aggravated felons" that were the
primary subject of prosecutions for violation of Title 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326 in past years.194
The reply noted prior apprehensions of the defendants and voluntary
returns to Mexico. 195 Ending the reply on a more personal note, the
U.S. Attorney acknowledged that "it is not certain that prosecuting
these defendants for felony violations will change their conduct," but
189. Order at 1-2, United States v. Ordones-Soto, No. A-09-CR-590-SS (W.D. Tex.
Feb. 5,2010).
190. Advisory to the Court at 2, United States v. Ordones-Soto, No. A-09-CR-590-SS
(W. D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2010) (quoting United States v. Molina, 530 F.3d 326, 332 (5th Cir.
2008)).
191. Id. (quoting United States v. Hamm, 659 F.2d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc)).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 3.
195. Id. at 3-4.
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argued he was not willing to wait for them to perhaps commit more
serious crimes.196 He observed that
Congress could change the laws or withdraw funding, and the
Attorney General could direct this office to address its
resources elsewhere. But they have not done so, and
accordingly, the undersigned anticipates that the office will
continue to prosecute similar violators in all divisions in this
District.197
The defendants all received a typical sentence for low-level
immigration offenses-time served.198
B. Bloat and Immigration Addiction .in Federal Criminal Justice
1. The Elite Fantasy and Crimmigration-Dominated Reality of
Federal Criminal Justice
The call to action and scenes from the front lines reveal the
troubled state of the federal criminal justice system. After all the
expense of criminal processing, deplored by Judge Sparks, the end
result was similar to what could be achieved civilly-deportation. The
difference was the cost and empty symbolism of criminal processing.
As will be discussed in this Part, the price in the aggregate has been
an immense burden on strained criminal justice resources and the
diluting of the features and protections of American criminal justice.
By 2012, immigration prosecutions were the single largest
category of federal case for the fourth consecutive year.199 The
number of felony immigration prosecutions in 2010 was an
astronomical 989% larger than the number in 1994.2" Of the
approximately one-third of cases that make it to federal district court,
the large majority-more than 75% in 2010 and 2011-were for
196. Id. at 6.
197. Id.
198. See Order at 1, United States v. Ordones-Soto, No. A-09-CR-590-SS (W.D. Tex.
Feb. 5, 2010) (noting all three defendants received time served).
199. EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATIORNEYS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
ATrORNEYS' ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 10-11 tbl.2.2 (2012);
EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS' ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 12 tbl.2.6 (2010).
200. In 2010, there were 26,731 felony immigration prosecutions in United States
federal courts. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, AOUSC CRIMINAL MASTER DATA
FILE, FY 2009, http://bjs.gov/fjsrc/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2013) (data set spanning 1998 to
2010). The figure of 2,453 prosecutions in 1994 is from MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRENDS 48, tbl.A.7 (2006), available
at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fcjt03.pdf.
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illegally entering or being found in the United States.201 Of
immigration offenders serving time in federal prison, 90% are there
because of an illegal entry or re-entry after deportation conviction.20
Moreover, data for felony prosecutions in district court
understate the extent of immigration prosecutions because many
defendants are disposed of by magistrate judges as overburdened
courts struggle with the crippling criminal immigration caseload.203
For example, in June 2013 alone, 6,889 immigration defendants were
processed by magistrate judges, mainly for illegal entry by an alien.204
Because of overload by a crushing criminal immigration caseload, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently declared a state of
emergency, tolling the Speedy Trial Act in the District of Arizona in a
"virtually unprecedented" move.205
In the crush, criminal procedure for immigration prosecutions
has been diluted down. Immigration defendants inhabit the twilight
world of quasi-criminal procedure with abbreviated process and
waiver of most rights. 206 The majority of these federal defendants
(two-thirds) are convicted and sentenced by magistrate judges rather
than federal district judges for misdemeanor illegal entry.207 Half of
these convictions and sentencings by magistrate judges occurred on
the same day as received by the court.208 At the most extreme of this
parody of criminal process, defense attorneys may represent multiple
defendants in "cattle call" processing, and prosecutors may even be
border patrol agents.209 Crimmigration procedure has become quasi-
criminal in nature-a process bearing a resemblance to criminal
processing and punishment-but lacking its protections and even
201. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FY 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 37 (2012) [hereinafter
2011 ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/ResearchandStatistics
/Annual-Reports andSourcebooks/2011/2011_AnnualReportChap5.pdf.
202. MOTIVANS, supra note 182, at 6.
203. See id. at 10 (noting that petty immigration crimes are counted in arrest and
investigation data but are excluded from prosecution conviction, sentencing, and
admission to prison data from the district courts because the cases are handled by
magistrate judges and not counted as prosecuted in the district courts).
204. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Immigration Convictions for June
2013 (July 22, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/immigration/monthlyjunl3
/gui/.
205. In re Approval of Judicial Emergency Declared in District of Arizona, 639 F.3d
970, 971, 975 (9th Cir. 2011). Only two circuit courts have ever approved declaration of a
judicial emergency-both more than thirty years ago. See id at 971.
206. See infra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
207. MOTIVANS, supra note 182, at 8.
208. Id.
209. Ingrid Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 1281, 1351-52 (2010).
117
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
using stand-ins for its key players. Besides cost, the ideals and
standards of American criminal justice are also being sacrificed.
This reality belies the fantasy of sophisticated federal criminal
justice. The swashbuckling acronym soup of federal law enforcers-
USAs,210 AUSAs,211 FBI,212 DEA,213 ICE214-generally enjoy greater
resources and prestige than their state counterparts. 215 The notion is
that federal law enforcers tackle the big fish and complex cases, for
example, organized crime, terrorist groups, corruption, and financial
fraud that have wreaked havoc on the national wellbeing.216 The
reality, however, is that most of the immigration cases that constitute
the biggest staple of the federal criminal justice system involve illegal
entry or aliens illegally remaining in the country-far simpler and
humbler than many of the cases handled by under-resourced state
officials.217 Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") and
Customs and Border Protection, the two main immigration policing
agencies, were the source of more prosecution referrals than all the
other Justice Department law enforcement agencies combined.218
After the 2008 financial collapse that devastated the economy,
the nation wondered why federal law enforcers "failed to act as [the]
crisis deepened" and why years later "no senior executives have been
charged or imprisoned and collective government effort [against such
210. United States Attorneys.
211. Assistant United States Attorneys.
212. Federal Bureau of Investigation.
213. Drug Enforcement Agency.
214. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
215. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story
of the "Evolution" of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 21 (1983) (describing
federal prosecutors as "an elite fraternity" and describing the "'old boy' network ...
between prosecutors and defense counsel"); Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at
the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets Brady, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1133, 1138 (2005)
(describing federal prosecutors as "an elite group with enormous prestige" and "virtually
unchecked discretion to screen, charge, and determine the sentence of the defendants who
are at his mercy"); Michael M. O'Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV.
783, 812 (2004) (describing federal law enforcement agencies as "small, elite, and
specialized").
216. See, e.g., Michael E. Horowitz & April Oliver, Foreword: The State of Federal
Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1033, 1039-40 (2006) (recounting how "[n]ot long ago,
in the criminal context, the federal courts were often viewed as somewhat rarified, the
province of specialized or complex cases").
217. See 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 201, at 37 (noting that most of the
immigration cases that have been the largest category of federal cases for the last three
years involve unlawful entry or illegally remaining in the country).
218. See Julia Preston, Huge Amounts Spent on Immigration, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 2013, at All.
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wrongdoing] has not emerged." 219 Indeed, data indicate that around
the time of the crisis, financial regulators had been referring
substantially fewer cases for criminal investigation.220 What was the
federal criminal justice system doing as the nation began burning? A
substantial part of the answer is immigration prosecutions, much like
the one that roused the judge's concern, while larger, more complex
actors remained virtually untouchable.221 Of course, this is not to
imply causation. Rather, the comparison is made simply to show the
relative investment of federal criminal justice resources between
complex crimes and the criminal processing of people prior to
deportation.
In 1990, immigration prosecutions constituted just 6.2% of
reported federal cases.222 In 1995, shortly before the passage of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 ("IIRIRA"),2 23 immigration prosecutions constituted 8.3% of
federal criminal cases.224 In contrast, fraud constituted 15.4% of
federal cases.225 The combination of what the United States
Sentencing Commission designates "non-fraud white-collar crimes"
(embezzlement, money laundering, forgery/counterfeiting, and tax)
219. Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, A Financial Crisis with Little Guilt, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2011, at Al; see also, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, Financial Crimes Bedevil
Prosecutors, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2011, at Cl (reporting on demands from lawmakers and
angry Americans for prosecution of high-profile executives who contributed to the
financial crisis and the difficulties of prosecuting these complex financial cases, especially
making a case of criminal intent).
220. See, e.g., Sandra D. Jordan, Victimization on Main Street: Occupy Wall Street and
the Mortgage Fraud Crisis, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 485, 497 (2011) (noting that "the
criminals responsible for the Great Recession have enjoyed relative immunity");
Morgenson & Story, supra note 219, at Al.
221. See infra figure 4 and note 226 (showing rising share of immigration prosecutions
between 1986 and 2011); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2011 BUDGET REQUEST:
RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN OUR MARKETS, PROTECT THE FEDERAL FiSC, AND DEFEND
THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1-2, 7 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov
/jmd/2011factsheets/pdf/defend-interests-unitedstates.pdf (requesting $234.6 million
budgetary increase to enable pursuit of mortgage fraud, corporate fraud, and other
economic crimes and reporting on the lack of resources, including lack of prosecutors, to
pursue such cases); Morgenson & Story, supra note 219, (reporting on refusal of Justice
Department to shift agents to mortgage fraud cases and the failure to pursue major
actors).
222. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION
ANNUAL REPORT 1990, at 42 (1991), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl
/Digitization/137914NCJRS.pdf.
223. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
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constituted 19.5% of cases. 226 By 2011, immigration prosecutions
constituted more than a third of all federal criminal cases.227 In
contrast, fraud constituted 9.8% of cases, and other non-fraud white-
collar cases constituted just 3.6% of federal cases. 22 8 Figure 4 contrasts
this sharp shift in the balance of major federal crime categories.229
Note that Figure 4 charts the change in relative proportions of cases
rather than the rise in volume of cases over time. The chart shows the
shift in relative federal prosecution priorities by proportion of cases.
FIGURE 4. THE RISE OF IMMIGRATION DOMINATION -
01 COMPARISON WITH OTHER MAJOR CRIME
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226. Id. at 42 fig.B. Generally, the U.S. Sentencing Commission considers fraud,
embezzlement, forgery/counterfeiting, bribery, tax offenses, and money laundering to
constitute economic offenses. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS fig.E n.1 (2012), [hereinafter 2011 SOURCEBOOK]
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research-andStatistics/AnnualReports-and Source
books/2011/FigureE.pdf. Beginning in 1997, the data were aggregated and reported as
"non-fraud white collar." See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1997 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS fig.A (1998), available at http://www.ussc.gov
/Researchand Statistics/AnnualReports-andSourcebooks/1997/FigA.pdf.
227. 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 201, at 37.
228. 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 226, at fig.A n.1.
229. The figures are collected from the longitudinal data set of Sentencing Commission
records, which the Commission began amassing between 1987 and 1989, after its existence
withstood constitutional attack. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989)
(upholding creation of U.S. Sentencing Commission).
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2. The Pressures and Costs of Bloat
Over the decades, resources have poured into immigration
investigation. By 1998, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") budget had billowed by nearly eight times its 1986 level.2 30 By
1999, the INS budget was $4.2 billion-with $900 million earmarked
for the Border Patrol, which was offering signing bonuses to rapidly
expand its ranks. 231' The INS, then the umbrella organization for
border policing, secured resources by painting the flow of drugs and
people over the border as a security threat.232 But the Border Patrol
found that it took "little effort and little staff time" to arrest
immigrants in large quantities, whereas narcotics enforcement was
much more labor-intensive.233
Fast and easy immigration prosecutions increasingly proved
alluring to prosecutors too.234 In the latter half of the 1990s, the
General Accounting Office began intensifying pressure on the Justice
Department to measure performance using "measurable targets" and
"performance goals" such as the output targets used in the private
sector.235 Justice Department officials tried to push back initially,
explaining that setting numerical targets for outputs such as number
of convictions over the year would compromise ethics, create the
appearance of hunting heads for loot, and compromise the quality of
justice. 2 36 In an internal memorandum, then-Attorney General Janet
230. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, JORGE DURAND & NOLAN J. MALONE, BEYOND SMOKE
AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 97
(2002).
231. Id. at 96.
232. See id. at 100-01.
233. Id. at 100.
234. For an analysis of how the values of criminal justice can be compromised when
numbers become the main focus of the criminal justice system, see Mary De Ming Fan,
Disciplining Criminal Justice: The Peril Amid the Promise of Numbers, 26 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 1, 27-48 (2007).
235. See Letter from Norman J. Rabkin, Dir., Admin. of Justice Issues, to the
Honorable Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary,
and the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., Ranking Minority Member, House of
Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary (May 29, 1998), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/90/87771.pdf (urging that the Department of Justice set
quantifiable targets); see also S. REP. NO. 103-58, at 4 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 327, 330 (quoting from a statement by Comptroller General Charles A.
Bowsher addressing how the lack of measurable goals used by federal agencies creates
inefficiencies in financial auditing).
236. See Letter from Norman J. Rabkin, supra note 235, at 5 (reporting on Justice
Department concerns); Memorandum from Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney Gen., for Heads of
Dep't of Justice Components on Using Statistics to Assess Performance (Feb. 8, 1999)
[hereinafter Reno Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom
/usestat.htm (expressing concerns on the use of statistics to measure performance).
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Reno expressed concern over the pressure to "set a target regarding a
future level of law enforcement activity-such as making numeric
projections for indicators such as arrests, indictments, convictions, or
asset seizures-without sufficient consideration to the quality or
impact of those actions." 237 .
Ultimately, however, the Justice Department succumbed to the
pressures and began setting targets for how many cases to bring in the
year ahead and the win rate to attain.238 The Justice Department
continues to set targets and report on how it met or exceeded them
each year in its budget requests to Congress.23 9 For example, the
target number of total defendants processed in fiscal year 2011 was
88,369, and the target win rate was 90% of cases.24 In its budget
request to Congress, the Justice Department reported that it had
exceeded these targets, processing 90,461 defendants in fiscal year
2011 with a 93% win rate.241
Prosecutorial success is measured by sustaining high processing
numbers, and the pressure has intensified as the increase in
prosecutorial funding has fallen below the rate of inflation, impeding
the ability to pursue more complex cases without immediate
conviction pay-offs.2 42 With federal criminal justice pressured into
doing what Reno had cautioned against-"striving to reach a targeted
goal, or quota, for its own sake, without regard to the activity's larger
purpose 243-immigration prosecutions became addictive.
Immigration cases are the fastest to process and yield high conviction
rates and vast body counts in terms of defendants prosecuted.244
Between 2000 and 2004, the median time for prosecution of
immigration cases fell from 115 days in 2000-already the lowest of
237. Reno Memorandum, supra note 236.
238. For a history, see Fan, supra note 234, at 16-27 (detailing the Department of
Justice's eventual embrace of statistics as a means of measuring performance).
239. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEYS FY 2013 PERFORMANCE BUDGET CONGRESSIONAL SUBMISSION 23
(2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013justification/pdflfyl3-usa-justification
.pdf (setting targets and reporting on whether prior year's targets were met).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., Scot J. Paltrow, Budget Crunch Hits U.S. Attorneys' Offices, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 31, 2007), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118852196664814175.html (discussing
funding woes).
243. Reno Memorandum, supra note 236.
244. See, e.g., 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 226, at tbl.11; Transactional Records
Access Clearinghouse, Prosecution Time by Department of Justice Program Category
(2005), http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/highlights/v04/protimeprogcat.html (showing the short
processing time of immigration cases).
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the major case categories-to just 37 days by 2004.245 While felony
immigration prosecutions in United States district court take more
time, the median case processing time is still substantially faster
compared to the processing time for other categories.2 46 Because of
the heavy immigration case volume, the five Southwest border
districts that handle the huge majority of all immigration cases, and
more than half of all federal cases, had a median case processing time
of just four months compared to nine months in non-Southwest
border districts.247 Moreover, the guilty plea rate is the highest for
immigration cases of all major case categories, for example, 99.4% in
fiscal year 2011.248
The rapid mass processing is enabled by streamlined fast-track
programs in which prosecutors recommend shorter sentences if
defendants waive their rights and plead guilty early, typically shortly
after the initial arraignment and appointment of counsel. 249 The
abbreviated process has roused concerns among defense attorneys
over the pressure to plead guilty based on scant discovery with no
opportunity for the defense attorney to investigate the legal or factual
issues.25 0 Such early disposition programs have withstood
constitutional challenges, however.251
The addiction to immigration prosecution has persisted though
migration into the United States has been falling substantially since
2007, as the United States economic decline reduced the lure of
245. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, supra note 244.
246. See MOTIVANS, supra note 182, at 24-25 (discussing the short average processing
times of immigration offenses in the Southwest border districts, as compared to the
average processing times in non-Southwest border districts).
247. Id. at 8, 24.
248. 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 226, at tbl.11. The only higher guilty plea rate was
the 100% rate for the handful of cases involving antitrust (0.01% of all federal cases); food
and drug violations (0.06% of all federal cases); and use of a communications facility in
committing a narcotics offense (0.5% of all federal cases). Id. As is evident from the tiny
fraction of cases these categories represent, none are a major category.
249. See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 22 (2011),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/Judicial
Business2011.pdf (reporting on short processing times); Alan D. Bersin & Judith S. Feigin,
The Rule of Law at the Margin: Reinventing Prosecution Policy in the Southern District of
California, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 285, 301-03 (1998) (describing fast-track immigration
prosecution policies).
250. See, e.g., Michael O'Connor & Celia Rumann, The Death of Advocacy in Re-Entry
After Deportation Cases, THE CHAMPION, Nov. 1999, at 43 (expressing concern over the
pressure for immigration defendants to plead guilty, often with scant discovery and no
attorney investigation into the legal or factual issues).
251. United States v. Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d 757, 761 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding the
government's application of its fast-track plea bargaining policy).
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jobs. 25 2 Between 2007 and 2009, the annual inflow of undocumented
migrants was nearly two-thirds less than from 2000 to 2005.253 Inflows
from Mexico-which represent about 60% of all undocumented
migrants-began plunging with the collapse of the United States
housing market and lure of construction jobs.254 Demographers
recently estimated that net inflow from Mexico has fallen to zero or
perhaps less because of the battered United States job market, the
border build-up and associated heightened dangers of border
crossing, rising deportations, and socioeconomic conditions in
Mexico, including declining birth rates.255
Despite the plunging rates of unauthorized migration and fewer
apprehensions at the border, the number of arrests for immigration
violations tripled between 2000 and 2010.256 By 2010, apprehensions
of unauthorized migrants reached the lowest level since 1972, but the
Border Patrol and other border policing agencies arrested three times
more people for referral to criminal prosecution rather than civil
processing. 257 The number of immigration prosecutions in district
courts rose by 72% between 2005 and 2010.258 The district court figure
does not capture the full extent of the rise because the vast majority
of immigration cases, two-thirds in 2010, were disposed of by
magistrate judges, who also handled a swelling number of
immigration cases. 259
Moreover, the massive army of Border Patrol agents nearly
doubled between 2004 and 2010, swelling past the hiring surges of the
1990s. 2 60 The large ranks of Border Patrol agents have huge political
lobbying power to force prosecutors to take their cases, even against
the prosecutors' better judgment about how best to allocate limited
resources on competing priorities. 261 For example, a former U.S.
252. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., U.S.
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRATION FLOWS ARE DOWN SHARPLY SINCE MID-DECADE, at i-
iii (2010), available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/126.pdf.
253. Id. at i.
254. JEFFRY PASSEL, D'VERA COHN & ANA GONZALEZ-BARRERA, PEW HISPANIC
CTR., NET MIGRATION FROM MEXICO FALLS TO ZERO-AND PERHAPS LESS 17 (2012),
available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/04/Mexican-migrants-report-final.pdf;
see also PASSEL & COHN, supra note 252, at i (60% of all undocumented migrants).
255. PASSEL, COHN & GONZALEZ-BARRERA, supra note 254, at 6.
256. MOTIVANS, supra note 182, at 7.
257. Id.
258. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 249, at 26.
259. MOTIVANS, supra note 182, at 8.
260. Id. at 6.
261. See, e.g., Fan, supra note 234, at 41 (detailing case of Carol Lam, a U.S. attorney
who was dismissed in controversial fashion in 2007).
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Attorney for the Southern District of California was controversially
dismissed after intense Border Patrol lobbying because her
"immigration deliverables" decreased when she focused on more
complex and culpable actors, such as violent drug cartels, fraudsters,
and corrupt politicians.262
Much has been made of prosecutorial discretion and the import
of sound judgment about how best to use limited resources to serve
competing public safety goals. 263 But in a time of intense pressures to
rack up and sustain conviction and processing statistics, prosecutorial
discretion to make wise judgments may be becoming more myth than
reality, particularly in border districts. Only 1% of immigration
matters referred by border policing agencies such as United States
Border Patrol and Immigrations and Customs Enforcement were
declined in 2010.26 Federal prosecutors facing a crushing load of
immigration cases must rely on fast-track processing because the
number of prosecutors has not risen nearly as dramatically as the
number of Border Patrol agents.265 Whether federal prosecutors want
to or not, the expensive artillery of criminal justice has increasingly
been used to do the work of civil immigration law.266 The
systematization of immigration prosecution and pressures against
exercising better judgment about use of resources only entrenches the
crimmigration addiction.
Prosecuting more migrants from a shrinking pool means wasting
resources on people with little to no criminal histories, a practice that
one federal judge criticized on the record. 267 Frank Zimring has noted
262. See Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is The Department of Justice
Politicizing the Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 149-50 (2007), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
110shrg35800/pdflCHRG-110shrg35800.pdf (testimony of D. Kyle Sampson, former Chief
of Staff to the Att'y Gen. of the United States).
263. Cf, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 38-40, 52, 139, 144 (1975)
(discussing the import of discretion, despite his critiques in the street policing context);
Michael Edmund O'Neill, When Prosecutors Don't: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial
Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 225 (2003) (discussing the need to exercise
discretion in a world of limited resources); Ellen S. Podgor, Race-ing Prosecutors' Ethics
Codes, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 474 (2009) (discussing how prosecutorial
discretion can be used with compassion to correct injustices).
264. MOTIVANS, supra note 182, at 19.
265. See id at 16 fig.12 (comparing sharp increase in Border Patrol officers with much
smaller rise in federal prosecutors).
266. See Eagly, supra note 209, at 1349 (arguing that increasingly "criminal law acts as
immigration law" and civil immigration enforcers increasingly operate within a criminal
framework, eroding the civil-criminal immigration distinction).
267. See Transcript of Sentencing Before the Hon. Sam Sparks at 3-4, United States v.
Ordones-Soto, No. 09CR590 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 4,2010).
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a similar problem in the overincarceration context. When
incarceration continues to rise though the pool of people committing
crimes is smaller, expensive prison resources are misspent on people
who do not pose a public danger, buying little to no incapacitation
benefit.2" Sentences for immigration offenses have fallen as more
people who would usually be processed civilly are swept up into the
criminal justice system to keep criminal processing statistics high.269
The number of minor defendants disposed of as misdemeanants by
magistrate judges have surged.270 While many defendants processed
by district judges still tend to have prior criminal histories, defendants
prosecuted by district judges rather than by magistrate judges
represent a minority of all immigration defendants.27'
Moreover, to the extent that immigration defendants serve
prison time rather than being deported, their stay in federal prison is
paid for by United States taxpayer dollars. It cost taxpayers an
average of $22,632 a year to house one prisoner in the Federal
Bureau of Prisons in 2001.272 The costs associated with the
incarceration of undocumented immigrants has been heavily
criticized, particularly by those favoring tough immigration laws.273 As
more states and localities have participated in cooperative
immigration investigation agreements with the federal government,
the costs of keeping immigrants in custody among the states has
268. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 52 (2007).
269. See MOTIVANS, supra note 182, at 30 fig.23 (graphing generally decreasing
sentences for illegal reentry between 1999 and 2010); Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse, Prison Sentences Drop for DHS-Immigration Convictions (2005),
http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/highlights/v04/dhsprisconvG.html (charting decline in
sentences).
270. See MOTIVANS, supra note 182, at 8, 26.
271. Id.
272. Edwin Mora, U.S. Spending at Least $18.6 Million per Day to Incarcerate Illegal
Aliens, CNS NEWS (Oct. 8, 2010, 3:58 PM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/us-spending-
least-186-million-day-incarcerate-illegal-aliens-more-195000-illegal-aliens.
273. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANTS ON THE BUDGETS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 12 (2007),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/87xx/doc8711/12-6-
immigration.pdf (noting that federal payments to the states for incarcerating unauthorized
immigrants do not offset expenses); JACK MARTIN & IRA MEHLMAN, FED'N FOR
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM (FAIR), THE COSTS OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION TO
ARIZONANS 4 (2004), available at http://www.fairus.org/site/DocServer/azcosts2.pdf
(decrying high prosecution and incarceration costs); Associated Press, Perry Bills Feds
$349M for Incarcerating Illegals, Fox NEWS (Aug. 27, 2011),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/08/27/perry-bills-feds-34m-for-incarcerating-illegals/
(noting attempts by conservatives to bill the federal government for the costs of
incarcerating unauthorized immigrants).
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mounted.274 An oft-decried figure is the $1.5 billion that states and the
federal government spent on incarcerating undocumented immigrants
for immigration and non-immigration offenses.275 Whether the stay in
prison is a few days pending criminal processing, or a year or more
following sentencing for an immigration conviction, the burden of
incarceration is borne by United States taxpayers.
C. The Civil Immigration Incarceration Complex
Incarceration due to criminal processing of immigrants is only
part of the cost burden. Civil detention, rather than criminal
processing or punishment, is a major reason for the explosive growth
of immigration incarceration. 276 Between 1994 and 2011, the yearly
number of people held in immigration detention skyrocketed nearly
430 %.277 Over the last decade and a half, ICE has become the
manager of the largest detention and supervised release system in the
271nation.
In 2011, ICE detained 429,247 people-an all-time high.27 9 The
immigration detention system held far more people in custody than
for all crimes in the federal criminal system, which in 2011 held
274. See NAT'L IMMIGRATION FORUM, IMMIGRANTS BEHIND BARS: How, WHY,
AND How MUCH? 9-10 (2011), available at http://immigrationforum.org/images
/uploads/2011/ImmigrantsinLocalJails.pdf.
275. See, e.g., Jordy Yager, GAO: $1.5B to Jail Unlawful Immigrants, THE HILL (Apr.
24, 2011, 10:37 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/157459-gao-15b-to-
jail-unlawful-immigrants-each-year (quoting critics).
276. For analyses of the expansion and statistics, see, for example, Mark Dow,
Designed to Punish: Immigrant Detention and Deportation, 74 SOC. RES. 533, 535 (2007);
Anil Kathan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 44-49
(2010); Sarah Gryll, Note, Immigration Detention Reform: No Band-Aid Desired, 60
EMORY L.J. 1211, 1218-34 (2011); Faiza W. Sayed, Note, Challenging Detention: Why
Immigrant Detainees Receive Less Process than "Enemy Combatants" and Why They
Deserve More, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1833,1836-44 (2011).
277. See JOHN SIMANSKI & LESLEY M. SAPP, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2011, at 4 (2012), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-
statistics/enforcement ar_2011.pdf (reporting 429,247 people in immigration custody in
2011); Kalhan, supra note 276, at 44-45 (reporting approximately 81,000 people in
immigration detention in 1994).
278. DORA SCHRIRO, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, IMMIGRATION
DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2009), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/aboutloffices/odpp/pdflice-detention-rpt.pdf.
279. SIMANSKI & SAPP, supra note 277, at 4.
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216,362 prisoners.280 The breakdown of the backgrounds accounting




* 5.5% El Salvadorans;
* 1% Dominicans;
* 0.8% Indians; and
* 0.7% Ecuadoreans.281
To house all the immigration detainees, ICE relies on a network of
more than 300 facilities, many run by private contractors such as the
Corrections Corporation of America.282
The cost of maintaining the nation's biggest detention complex is
massive. For fiscal year 2013, the Department of Homeland Security
requested more than $1.9 billion for its custody operations.28 3 This
request was actually a decrease of about $91.2 million from the
amount Congress gave ICE in fiscal year 2012 for its custody
operations.284 The cost figure was for maintaining 32,800 detention
beds at a cost of $122 a day per person.285 The detention beds are
distributed in a mix of Federal Bureau of Prisons facilities, federal
detention centers, ICE-owned detention facilitates, and contract
facilities. 286
Many of the facilities holding immigration detainees were built
287as jails and prisons. Movement is generally restricted in these
facilities and some detainees are imprisoned alongside sentenced
criminals despite the ostensibly civil nature of immigration
detention. 288 An increasing proportion of immigrants held in
detention have no criminal history.289 About 95% of detainees are
280. See E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS
IN 2011, at 2 tbl.1, 11 tbl.12 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pll.pdf
(reporting prison counts at year-end 2011).
281. SIMANSKI & SAPP, supra note 277, at 4.
282. See Nina Bernstein, Dependent on Jail, City of Immigrants Fills Jail Cells with Its
Own, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2008, at Al.
283. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT SALARIES AND EXPENSES: FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 5, 35, in UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT:
FISCAL YEARS 2011-2013, at 5 (2013).
284. Id. at 35.
285. Id. at 36.
286. Id. at 36-37.
287. See SCHRIRO, supra note 278, at 21.
288. See id.
289. See Kalhan, supra note 276, at 44-45 (reporting approximately 81,000 people in
immigration detention in 1994).
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released within four months of incarceration but about 1%-
amounting to 2,100 people in 2009-were detained for a year or
more.290 Rejecting constitutional challenges to immigration detention,
the Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis2 91 noted that "[t]he
proceedings at issue here are civil, not criminal, and we assume that
they are nonpunitive in purpose and effect."2" The reality of
immigration detention, however, is incarceration in harsh conditions
similar to-and sometimes essentially the same as-criminally-
convicted defendants.
Civil immigration detention in criminal-like conditions has
sparked controversy and criticism, including from the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights.293 In recent years, the overburdened
immigration detention system has been plagued with scandals over
needless suffering and even death as inmates held in filthy conditions
and sometimes intense pain waited for attention from swamped
officials.294 More than 100 immigration detainees have died in custody
since 2003, many of them young people.295 Some immigration
detainee deaths were preventable, such as the death of a 34-year-old
detainee whose life could have been saved by aspirin.296 A growing
number of voices have argued that the incarceration of civil
immigration detainees in criminal punishment-like conditions without
criminal process or protections violates due process and human rights
norms. 297
Why has the immigration incarceration complex exploded so
precipitously and with such severe consequences? The answer
290. SCHRIRO, supra note 278, at 6. ICE has been working to decrease the average
length of stay from around 31 days in 2009 and 2010 to 29.2 days in 2011. See U.S. DEP'T
OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 283, at 39.
291. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
292. Id. at 690.
293. See, e.g., INTER-AM. COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON IMMIGRATION IN
THE UNITED STATES: DETENTION AND DUE PROCESS 85-92, 108-09, 124, 148-49 (2010),
available at http://cidh.org/pdf%20files/ReportOnImmigrationInTheUnited%2OStates-
DetentionAndDueProcess.pdf.
294. See, e.g., Dow, supra note 276, at 537-39; Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The
State of Mandatory Immigration Detention, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601, 601-04
(2010); Nina Bernstein, Man's Death in Private Immigration Jail Bares Difficulty of
Detention Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2009, at A13; Dana Priest & Amy Goldstein,
System of Neglect, WASH. POST, May 11, 2008, at Al.
295. See Priest & Goldstein, supra note 294; Nina Bernstein, Officials Hid Truth of
Immigrant Deaths in Jail, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com
/2010/01/10/us/10detain.html?ref=incustodydeaths&_r=0.
296. Priest & Goldstein, supra note 294.
297. See, e.g., INTER-AM. COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 293; Dow, supra
note 276, at 533; Kalhan, supra note 276, at 44-45.
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involves laws and policies shaped by the storms of history.
Immigration detention is not a new practice. Infamously, immigrants
in the early decades of the 1900s were held in harsh conditions for
weeks-and sometimes years in wartime-at New York Harbor's
Ellis Island.298 In 1956, however, the INS adopted a rule under which
deportation proceedings would generally begin with issuance of an
Order to Show Cause rather than an arrest, though on the books the
Attorney General retained the discretion to arrest.299 Detention
policies began toughening, however, in the 1980s and 1990s as waves
of Cubans, Haitians, and Central Americans landing on American
shores roused national concern.3 00 To deter Haitians from setting sail
for the United States, President Ronald Reagan promulgated
mandatory detention policies.301 The use of mandatory detention
further expanded when Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1988, which among other provisions, required detention for
aggravated felons awaiting deportation.302
The biggest legal landmark in the expansion of mandatory
detention, however, was the IIRIRA.303 IIRIRA ramped up civil
immigration detention in at least two major ways. First, IIRIRA
required mandatory detention of inadmissible arriving aliens claiming
asylum, meaning noncitizens applying for admission at a port of entry
or interdicted in international waters who claim asylum."* Such
asylum seekers are detained for the pendency of proceedings to
adjudicate their claim of a credible fear of persecution and until
removal if their asylum petition is ultimately denied.3 05
Second, IIRIRA mandated detention for inadmissible or
deportable aliens who have committed a wide range of offenses,
298. See, e.g., Henry P. Guzda, Ellis Island a Welcome Site? Only After Years of
Reform, 109 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 30, 30-36 (1986).
299. 21 Fed. Reg. 97, tit. 8, §§ 242.1-2 (Jan. 6, 1956); see also, e.g., Johns v. Dep't of
Justice, 653 F.2d 884, 889 n.7 (5th Cir. 1981) (describing the history of the process before
1956).
300. See Sayed, supra note 276, at 1836-37.
301. MARK Dow, AMERICAN GULAG: INSIDE U.S. IMMIGRATION PRISONS 45 (2004).
302. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7343(a)(4), 102 Stat. 4181,
4470.
303. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). See generally Nancy Morawetz,
Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of
Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000) (discussing the impact of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act).
304. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(q)
(2013) (defining the term "arriving aliens").
305. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) ("Any alien subject to the procedures under this
clause shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and,
if found not to have such a fear, until removed.").
130 [Vol. 92
THE CASE FOR CRIMMIGRATION REFORM
ranging from major to minor offenses such as prostitution or drug
possession if the statutory maximum is over a year.306 Mandatory
detention means no opportunity to argue for release on bond because
one presents no risk of flight or danger to the community-factors
customarily considered in criminal cases in deciding whether someone
should be released on bond.3 07 Moreover, review of whether the
defendant even has a qualifying offense for mandatory detention is
constricted. An alien may challenge the detention decision before an
immigration judge only by showing that he "was not convicted of the
predicate crime, or the INS is otherwise substantially unlikely to
establish that he is in fact subject to mandatory detention." 308
The use of mandatory detention has further grown after the
national shock of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.309 The
growth has been a function of law and practice. As to law, the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001 authorized mandatory detention of
noncitizens who the Attorney General has reasonable grounds to
believe are engaged in terrorist activity or "any other activity that
endangers the national security of the United States."310 Concerns
have been raised about the use of this power to hold suspects in the
twilight of civil detention without criminal process.311
Generally, the Supreme Court has been reticent about
intervening in immigration detention. In Demore v. Kim,312 the
Supreme Court rejected a challenge to mandatory detention.3 13 The
challenge was brought by Hyung Joon Kim, a lawful permanent
resident who faced deportation proceedings because of convictions
for first-degree burglary and petty theft.314 Kim argued that his
306. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2012); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), (a)(2)(D)(i)
(listing engagement of prostitution or a controlled substances offense with a statutory
maximum of over a year as qualifying grounds); see also, e.g., Gryll, supra note 276, at
1213-14 (describing mandatory immigration detention of long-time legal permanent
resident with prior drug possession conviction).
307. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-42 (governing pretrial release).
308. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 514 n.3 (2003) (citing Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N.
Dec. 799 (B.I.A. 1999)).
309. See Charles D. Weisselberg, The Detention and Treatment of Aliens Three Years
After September 11: A New World?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 815, 824-41 (2005).
310. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(1).
311. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 2 (2004); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF
ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 3-5 (2003).
312. 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
313. Id. at 531.
314. Id. at 513.
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detention violated due process because immigration authorities had
made no determination that he either posed a danger to society or
was a flight risk before detaining him.315 Writing for the Court, Justice
Rehnquist reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling that mandatory
detention violated substantive due process.316 Justice Rehnquist
underscored that "in the exercise of its broad power over
naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that
would be unacceptable if applied to citizens."317 Noting that detention
periods typically last roughly a month and half in the vast majority of
immigration cases, though detention lasted six months in Kim's case,
Justice Rehnquist held mandatory immigration detention was
constitutionally permissible.1
More recently, the Supreme Court has imposed some detention
length limits through statutory interpretation to avoid constitutional
concerns. The Court has construed immigration laws to authorize the
government to hold inadmissible or removable aliens for a period
reasonably necessary to effectuate removal and not indefinitely or
potentially permanently.319 In the domain of immigration detention,
however, the Court has generally shown great deference to the
political branches. For significant change to curb the costs of
immigration detention, the political branches must act.
IV. CURBING OVERBREADTH COSTS IN IMMIGRATION
CRIMINALIZATION AND DETENTION
The contours of the comprehensive immigration reform agenda
are still being hammered out. Much of the early energy has been
devoted to proposing paths to legal status for undocumented people,
also dubbed amnesty by opponents who succeeded in defeating
proposals in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2010.320 Whether or not a deal is
reached on the status adjustment, the fierce battles should not blind
legislative leaders and the nation to the need to address the costs,
waste, and controversy generated by immigration criminalization and
civil detention overbreadth.
315. Id. at 514.
316. Id. at 531 (reversing Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523 (9th Cir. 2002)).
317. Id. at 522 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305-06 (1993)).
318. Id. at 529-31.
319. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001) ("[O]nce removal is no longer
reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized."); see also Clark v.
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005) (extending the holding in Zadvydas to aliens deemed
inadmissible).
320. See supra notes 4-7.
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Reform proposals must avoid the trap of all-or-nothing thinking
and accusation of radicalism. Reform of criminal immigration laws
need not entail abolition or wholesale decriminalization.3 21 Finding a
smarter alternative to continuing to feed a multi-billion-dollar civil
immigration incarceration complex does not mean sending criminal
aliens likely to abscond onto the streets.322 These proclamations of
moderation may not be fully satisfactory to egalitarians seeking more
radical reform. Progress has oft-derailed, however, in search of the
impossible purist vision that appeals to a particular worldview.
Law is often tilted toward the visions of the powerful and
maintaining hierarchist order.323 Immigration law is particularly tilted
toward a hierarch's vision of order and against an egalitarian's dream
of de-stratification because immigration law fundamentally stratifies
groups seeking to be a part of the United States. Egalitarians hoping
to change and humanize harsher aspects of immigration law thus bear
a heavier burden of bridging the divide in worldviews and framing
issues in terms that also appeal to hierarchs. This Part presents two
proposals that can curb the resulting harms to values important to
both egalitarians and hierarchs. First, this Article argues that
resources can be better spent by requiring indicia of risk beyond
undocumented status for deployment of the expensive artillery of
criminal justice. Second, this Article argues that the federal system
should learn from the states in pursuing smarter and more cost-
effective solutions than wide-scale immigration incarceration without
sufficient risk assessment about whether the benefits are worth the
costs.
A. Recalibrating the Baseline for Criminal Processing Rather than
Civil Removal
Sometimes the best insights for reform can emerge from a
veteran of the front lines. Recall the concerns of Judge Sparks
321. Cf. Victor C. Romero, Decriminalizing Border Crossings, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
273, 299-300 (2010) (arguing for decriminalizing unlawful entry into the United States).
322. Cf, e.g., Yvonne Wingett Sanchez & J.J. Hensley, DOJ Accuses Ariz. Sheriffs
Office of Profiling, USA TODAY, Dec. 16, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 26071783
(statement of Sheriff Joe Arpaio accusing the Department of Homeland Security of
freeing suspected illegal immigrants from jail to be "dumped on the streets, in
neighborhoods near you").
323. Cf, e.g., Michael McCann & George I. Lovell, Executing "Good" Civil Rights
Law: A Political History of Wards Cove v. Atonio 8 (2013) (unpublished manuscript)
("The status of official law at any time reflects the outcome of continuous contests, most
often biased toward the hierarchical, market based commitments of dominant groups.")
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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regarding the "mind boggling" expenses of "prosecuting illegal entry
and re-entry cases (rather than deportation) [of] aliens without any
significant criminal record."3 2 4 Judge Sparks, descendant of a
venerable line of Texas sheriffs and an appointee of Republican
President George W. Bush, is no soft touch on crime.325 Rather, his
concern was smarter use of the heavy and expensive arsenal of
criminal law and fiscal responsibility. The defendants before him were
going to get time served and then be civilly deported because of their
lack of criminal history.32 6 They could have just been civilly deported
without going through the motions of criminal processing.32 7 Why pay
extra for county jail facilities, prosecutors' time and costs, U.S.
Marshal's Service costs, U.S. Probation Office costs, criminal court
personnel costs, appointed criminal defense counsel costs, court
interpreters' expenses, medical, dental and housing expenses, and
transportation costs?3 28
As discussed in Part III.B, part of the reason for such bafflingly
wasteful expenditures is that immigration prosecutions are a quick
and easy way to rack up massive conviction statistics to meet case
processing and conviction quotas.329 Prosecuting unlawful aliens for
immigration crimes is not rocket science. Immigration criminalization
is so broad that the simple fact of apprehension in the United States
nearly speaks for itself once alienage and lack of authorization is
established. That enhances the allure of immigration prosecutions-
and their addictive "empty calorie" effect. The immigration
prosecutions have an empty calorie effect in the sense that many
defendants without criminal histories get time served and are
removed afterward, yet they are a fast way to build statistical bloat.330
The problem is that the huge conviction and case processing quotas
324. Order at 2, United States v. Ordones-Soto, No. A-09-CR-590-SS (W.D. Tex. Feb.
5, 2010).
325. See, e.g., Rick Casey, Texas' Powerful Mini-Lynch Mob, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, Apr. 3, 2000, available at 2000 WLNR 9677556 (noting Judge Sparks was
recommended by Republican Sen. Phil Gramm for a judgeship, appointed by President
George W. Bush, and "is a law-and-order conservative, but he puts emphasis on the word
'law' ").
326. See supra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
327. See Order at 2-3, United States v. Ordones-Soto, No. A-09-CR-590-SS (W.D. Tex.
Feb. 5, 2010) ("These three defendants-like many of the defendants prosecuted [under] 8
U.S.C. § 1326 in the last six months-have no significant criminal history, and the
prosecuting Assistant United States Attorney cannot state a reason that these three
defendants were prosecuted rather than simply removed from the United States.").
328. Id.
329. See supra Part III.B.2.
330. See supra Part III.B.2.
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that law enforcers target to secure funding each year do not speak to
the public safety gained by the action.33 1 Yet funding and
performance evaluations are measured by such conviction statistics;
indeed, target numbers of defendants processed and win rates are set
in advance each year.332 Taxpayers and overburdened courts have to
bear the costs for the quasi-criminal costume drama.
Judge Sparks's critique suggests a cure for the worst of the waste.
Prosecutors can choose to pursue aliens without significant criminal
history because currently the criminal laws criminalizing being found
in or entering the United States simply require proof of alien status.
The heavy and expensive artillery of criminal justice can be better
aimed by requiring indicia of risk beyond criminal status, such as
significant prior criminal history, for criminalization. At a minimum,
to warrant criminal intervention rather than standard civil processing,
the crime should specify a factor that poses a greater risk of harm
warranting more than a time-served disposition.
While criminal history is an imperfect proxy for risk, it is a better
one than mere alienage. Indeed, criminal history is a crucial factor in
calibrating sentences because of the understanding that people with
prior criminal history may be in greater need of deterrence and
incapacitation and may pose a greater risk.333 Before people are
treated as risks, there should be a basis for the assumption such as
prior significant criminal history. The question of what counts as
significant criminal history that sufficiently indicates risk is a matter
for democratic deliberation.
The fundamental point, however, is that criminal punishment
and its costs should not turn just on the status of being an alien. Civil
regulation rather than criminal punishment is the traditional method
of addressing people who lack the documents or fortuity of birth to be
lawfully in the United States.334 As Deputy Secretary of State William
J. Burns explained:
U.S. immigration law-and our uniform foreign policy
regarding the treatment of foreign nationals-has provided that
331. See supra Part III.B.2.
332. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 239, at 23 (setting targets and reporting on
whether prior year's targets were met).
333. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, RESEARCH SERIES ON THE RECIDIVISM OF
FEDERAL GUIDELINE OFFENDERS, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL HISTORY
COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 13-14 (2004); Linda Drazga
Maxfield, Measuring Recidivism Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 17 FED. SENT'G
REP. 166, 167-68 (2005).
334. See Declaration of William J. Burns at 25-26, United States v. Alabama, Nos.
5:11-cv-02484, 02736, 02746 (N.D. Ala. July 29, 2011).
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the unlawful presence of a foreign national, itself, ordinarily
will not lead to that foreign national's criminal arrest,
incarceration, or other punitive measures (e.g., legislated
homelessness) but instead to civil removal proceedings.
Unlawful presence is a basis for removal, not retribution. This is
a policy that is understood internationally, that is consonant
with multilateral resolutions expressing the view that an
individual's migration status should not in itself be a crime, and
that is both important to and supported by foreign
governments. This policy has been the subject of repeated
international discussions, and is firmly grounded in the United
States' human rights commitments as well as our interest in
having our own citizens treated humanely when abroad.335
How is this policy consistent with the current two most
frequently prosecuted crimes in federal criminal justice, illegal entry
by an alien336 and being a previously deported alien found in the
United States?337 The distinction is vanishingly thin but, for the crime
of illegal entry, hinges on the conduct of entry plus alien status. It is
even harder to distinguish the felony of being a previously deported
alien found in the United States from the bald criminalization of
unlawful presence by an alien. While the formal policy is that
unlawful presence is a basis for removal rather than retribution,
unlawful presence following deportation is currently a widely-used
basis for criminal retribution.
The principle that unlawful presence is dealt with through civil
removal rather than criminal prosecution is not just a matter of
normative perspective. We need not wade into the bog of
contestation over the quantum of retributive moral desert for
unlawful entry and presence. Rather, the principle makes sense as a
matter of cost-efficiency and common sense. Why activate the
expensive heavy artillery of criminal law for something customarily
addressed by civil removal just to reach largely the same outcome of
removal? Narrowing the vast breadth of criminal immigration law
would circumscribe the discretion to simply fill statistics with
undocumented people regardless of whether there is any value to
processing them criminally. This better ensures that resources are
spent where they may add value.
335. Id.
336. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012).
337. Id. § 1326.
136 [Vol. 92
2013] THE CASE FOR CRIMMIGRATION REFORM
B. Beyond Racial and Ethnic Proxies for Criminal Immigration Law
Requiring more than alien status as the boundary line for
criminalizing entering or being found in the United States also can
help lessen the problems of racial and ethnic targeting in immigration
investigation. The historical ambition of enabling vast discretion to
target the racial or ethnic bogeyman of the day lingers in the broad
structure of immigration criminalization laws. The alien status that is
the sine qua non of the crimes of illegal entry by an alien, and being a
previously deported alien found in the United States is intimately
intertwined with race, ethnicity, and national origin.338 In criminal law
enforcement, courts are rejecting the use of race and ethnicity as an
indicator of criminal propensity-the likelihood of committing a
crime.339 But in the immigration context, race and ethnicity have long
been used as a heuristic-a rough and potentially inaccurate cognitive
rule-of-thumb-for the alien status that transforms entry or being
found in the United States into a crime.340
As discussed in Part II.A, the notion that race or ethnicity is
relevant to suspicion of alien status was partially blessed by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.3 41 Brignoni-Ponce
reasoned that since about 85% of aliens are of Mexican origin and at
least 8.5% to 20.4% of the people of Mexican origin in border states
are registered aliens, "Mexican appearance" was a relevant factor for
suspicion of unlawful entry, albeit insufficient as the sole basis for an
investigative stop. 342 Brignoni-Ponce reasoned:
338. See supra notes 149-53, 165 and accompanying text.
339. See, e.g., United States v. Ramos, 591 F. Supp. 2d 93, 105-07 (D. Mass. 2008)
(collecting cases forbidding the use of race as a basis of reasonable suspicion of criminality
supporting an investigative stop); Farag v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 436, 463-67
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (discussing cases rejecting the use of a race as an indicator of propensity
for criminal activity); Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law
of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for
Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1039 (2010) (arguing that "the law does
not permit express reliance on race as an indicator of criminal activity" and that
immigration enforcement is anomalous in permitting race "to serve as one indicator of
potential undocumented immigration status").
340. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887 (1975) (holding that
"Mexican appearance" is a relevant factor in reasonable suspicion albeit cannot be the
sole factor); Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (addressing
allegations that Border Patrol agents engage in a practice of principally focusing on
"Latin, Hispanic or Mexican appearance" of vehicle drivers or occupants in deciding
whether to stop cars); Johnson, supra note 339, at 1029 n.136 (collecting cases relying on
the Brignoni-Ponce factors, including race, and discussing how stops because of risk can
later be justified in terms of myriad post-hoc indicia of suspicion).
341. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 887; see supra Part II.A.
342. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 879 & n.5, 886 n.12.
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Large numbers of native-born and naturalized citizens have the
physical characteristics identified with Mexican ancestry, and
even in the border area a relatively small proportion of them
are aliens. The likelihood that any given person of Mexican
ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance
a relevant factor, but standing alone it does not justify stopping
all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are aliens.343
Today, the vast majority of immigrants originate from Latin America
and Asia.3" According to Pew Center statistics, people from Latin
America (50%) and Asia (27%) account for 77% of all immigrants.345
Unauthorized immigrants from Latin America account for 81% of all
of the nation's approximately eleven million unauthorized
immigrants.3 46 Asia is the next largest source of unauthorized
immigrants, accounting for 11%.347 Together, Latin America and Asia
account for 92% of all unauthorized immigrants.348 Thus it remains
the case that the vast majority of all aliens-especially unauthorized
aliens-have a Hispanic or Asian profile.
That is only part of the story, however. As the proportions of
Asian Americans and Hispanic Americans have grown, the
probability that someone of Asian or Hispanic appearance has
illegally entered the United States has decreased.34 9 As Judge
Reinhardt wrote for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc in United States
v. Montero-Camargo,m the Hispanic population has increased at least
fivefold in the border states that the Supreme Court referenced-and
Hispanics are the majority population in some areas.3 5' He concluded
that "[r]easonable suspicion requires particularized suspicion, and in
an area in which a large number of people share a specific
characteristic, that characteristic casts too wide a net to play any part
343. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886-87 (emphasis added).
344. PEW HISPANIC CTR., A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS: A PORTRAIT OF THE 40
MILLION, INCLUDING 11 MILLION UNAUTHORIZED 2 (2013).
345. Id.
346. JEFFREY PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED




349. See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2000) (en
banc).
350. 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000).
351. Id. at 1133.
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in a particularized reasonable suspicion determination." 35 2 The
Supreme Court denied certiorari.353
While Montero-Camargo was a bold challenge to the notion of
racial relevance to suspicion of criminal unlawful entry, Brignoni-
Ponce's racial relevance statement is still quoted with approval as
authority in reasonable suspicion cases.354 Moreover, even in the
Ninth Circuit, in areas with smaller concentrations of Hispanics, the
Court has held that Brignoni-Ponce's rationale holds sway and
Montero-Camargo's attempt to distinguish the Supreme Court's racial
relevance holding does not apply.355 Litigants arguing that the rise in
the Hispanic population renders Brignoni-Ponce inapplicable also
must wrestle with the fact that Brignoni-Ponce was not based just on
the probability that a person of Hispanic appearance is likely to be an
alien in any given region. Brignoni-Ponce also emphasized the
predominance of people of Hispanic appearance among those
apprehended as aliens in its racial relevance analysis.356 This latter
rationale is predicated on the ethnic predominance among
immigration defendants. And, as discussed in the data and charts in
Part II.C, ethnic predominance persists.
The data on ethnic and racial predominance and jurisprudence
on racial relevance to reasonable suspicion is the Achilles heel of suits
pending in the courts over the state immigration investigation
provisions left standing for further litigation.357 The challenged
provisions generally require state officers to make reasonable
attempts to determine the immigration status of any person stopped,
detained or arrested if "reasonable suspicion exists that the person is
an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States" unless certain
documents are produced.5 The immigration status investigation
352. Id. at 1134 (emphasis added).
353. Sanchez-Guillen v. United States, 531 U.S. 889 (2000) (mem.).
354. See, e.g., United States v. Vite-Espinoza, 342 F.3d 462, 468 (6th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d 1481, 1487 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Costilla-
Alfano, 726 F. Supp. 327, 336 (D. Mass. 1989).
355. United States v. Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 935-36 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2006).
356. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879 & n.5 (1975).
357. See, e.g., United States v. South Carolina, 840 F. Supp. 2d 898, 926 (D.S.C. 2011)
(granting preliminary injunction on certain provisions of a South Carolina immigration
law); Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1331-33 (N.D.
Ga. 2011) (enjoining immigration investigation law temporarily); Utah Coal. of La Raza v.
Herbert, No. 2:11-CV-401 CW, 2011 WL 7143098, at *1 (D. Utah May 11, 2011) (granting
temporary injunction).
358. E.g., ALA. CODE § 31-13-12 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (similar provision); Support
Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450,
(codified in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. tits. 11, 13, 23, 28, 41 (2012), as
amended by Act of Apr. 30, 2010, ch. 211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1070, 1073-78); accord
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provision has roused national and international concern over
potential racial and ethnic targeting and stigmatization as well as fears
over the use of race and ethnicity to establish reasonable suspicion.359
In Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court invalidated three
of four provisions on review from Arizona's immigration
criminalization legislation on federal preemption grounds because of
conflict with national immigration law and enforcement policy.360 But
the Court left standing the immigration investigation provision for
further development by the lower courts, studiously avoiding the
issue of race and reasonable suspicion.361 It remains an open question
whether state officers may stop a person of color for some minor
offense such as a traffic violation, and then prolong the detention by
asserting reasonable suspicion of illegal entry based on mannerisms,
appearance, and other factors.362
The Court's hope is that the lower courts will construe the
provisions in a manner that avoids conflict with federal law.363 The
implicit hope is that the statutes may be construed and enforced in a
way to avoid having to confront the festering and murky issue of the
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-13-170 (Supp. 2012) (similar provision), preliminary injunction
granted, United States v. South Carolina, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 926; see also GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-5-100(b) (2013) (authorizing peace officers to verify immigration status "during any
investigation of a criminal suspect" where the officer "has probable cause to believe that a
suspect has committed a criminal violation" where the suspect is unable to provide an
enumerated form of identification such as a Georgia driver's license), preliminary
injunction granted, Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 1331-33,
1340; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-1003 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (requiring law enforcement
officers to request verification of citizenship or immigration status of people stopped or
detained for class A misdemeanors and felonies and permitting such verification for class
B or C misdemeanors), temporary restraining order granted, Utah Coal. of La Raza, No.
2:11-CV-401 CW, 2011 WL 7143098, at *1 (D. Utah May 11, 2011).
359. See, e.g., Editorial, A Challenge to a Brutal Anti-Latino Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
2012, at A18 (discussing how § 2(B) of the Arizona law was aimed at codifying the
controversial practices of Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio, who has been sued for targeting
Latinos); Chin & Johnson, supra note 84, at A15 (discussing why the Arizona provision
enables racial profiling); Alan Gomez, Hispanics, Police at Odds in Alabama:
Implementing Immigration Law Has Some Complaining of Harassment, USA TODAY,
July 24, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 15450140 (reporting on concerns by Hispanic
residents of Alabama about "constant harassment and racial profiling" by police operating
under a similar immigration investigation provision as § 2(B) of the Arizona law).
360. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2509 (2012).
361. Id. at 2509.
362. See id. ("There is no need in this case to address whether reasonable suspicion of
illegal entry or another immigration crime would be a legitimate basis for prolonging a
detention, or whether this too would be preempted by federal law.").
363. See id. at 2510 (stating that "without the benefit of a definitive interpretation from
the state courts it would be inappropriate to assume" a construction that conflicts with
federal law and citing admonitions to construe statutes in ways to avoid constitutional
questions).
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continuing relevance of Brignoni-Ponce. Should race, ethnicity and
national origin continue to be relevant in the reasonableness analysis?
And is this approach consistent with federal crimmigration law and
policy? Arizona v. United States gave the lower courts hints as to how
to avoid these intensely controversial questions. The opinion
suggested that if the investigation provision is interpreted as "only
requir[ing] state officers to conduct a status check during the course
of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been
released, the provision likely would survive preemption-at least
absent some showing that it has other consequences that are adverse
to federal law and its objectives." 3 6 In other words, do the
immigration investigation during detention for some other offense
and avoid basing prolonged detention on reasonable suspicion of
illegal entry.
Why has the Court so doggedly avoided revisiting the larger issue
of racial and ethnic relevance in reasonable suspicion of an
immigration crime? Part of the answer may be that the solutions for
the intensely complex and controversial question are best framed in
the political branches. Indeed Justice Kennedy concluded Arizona v.
United States with a call for thoughtful deliberation:
Immigration policy shapes the destiny of the Nation .... The
National Government has significant power to regulate
immigration. With power comes responsibility, and the sound
exercise of national power over immigration depends on the
Nation's meeting its responsibility to base its laws on a political
will informed by searching, thoughtful, rational civic
discourse. 65
In the next round of immigration reform, Congress has the
opportunity to tackle the question rather than leaving it for the courts
to struggle over. Federal criminal immigration law reform that bases
criminalization on indicia of risk such as alienage plus significant
criminal history rather than merely alienage can at once better direct
the expensive artillery of criminal law and avoid the use of race,
ethnicity, and national origin as a proxy for criminal status. Requiring
more than alien status for criminalization of unlawful entry or being
found in the United States will further dilute the logic of reliance on
race or ethnicity as a proxy for criminality.
364. Id. at 2509.
365. Id. at 2510.
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C. Learning from the States on Incarceration and More Cost-
Effective Approaches
Immigration incarceration-both from criminal and civil
processing-is another issue urgently in need of congressional
leadership. Here the federal government can learn from the
awakening of the states to the costs of overincarceration and turn to
more cost-effective approaches. For the first time in nearly forty years
the nation's prison population began declining rather than rising in
2010.366 In 2011, incarceration continued to decline for the second
consecutive year, by 0.9%, a small but remarkable change from the
patterns of the past.367 In 2012, the number of prison inmates declined
for the third consecutive year, by 1.7%.368 Buffeted by economic
crises, communities across the nation and political spectrum are
seeking ways to be smart rather than spendthrift on crime to curb
extravagant prison spending.36 9 In a time of budget crises and the
need for greater fiscal discipline, leaders not typically associated with
egalitarian politics such as Newt Gingrich are even joining in leading
the decarceration movement, dubbed being right on crime by
conservatives.370
Besides incarceration costs for criminal processing, the costs
associated with civil immigration detainees generated by both the
federal criminal and civil administrative systems are a massive billion-
366. PAUL GUERINO, PAIGE M. HARRSION & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., BULL. NCJ 236096, PRISONERS IN 2010, at 1 (2012),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf.
367. E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STAT., BULL. NCJ 236096, PRISONERS IN 2011, at 1-2 (2012),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf.
368. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Prison
Population Declined for the Third Consecutive Year During 2012, at 1-2 (July 25, 2013),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2013/ojpprO72513.pdf.
369. See, e.g., Fan, supra note 46, at 595, 620, 634-39; Cheryl Cadue, Budget Cuts
Challenge Progress Made by States and Elicit Even Smarter Reforms, CORRECTIONS
TODAY, Feb. 2010, at 68 (detailing reforms); Custody v. Community Sentences: Smart on
Crime, THE ECONOMIST (May 4, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21554207 (noting
reform movements in England and America); Mike Maciag, Prison Counts Decline As
States Enact Reforms, GOVERNING: BY THE NUMBERS (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.governing.com/blogs/by-the-numbers/state-prison-population-totals-
decline.html (reporting on reforms); Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, State
Measures to Close Budget Gaps (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/budget/state-measures-to-close-budget-gaps.aspx (database of state criminal
justice reforms).
370. See, e.g., Newt Gingrich & Pat Nolan, Saving Money, Saving Lives, WASH. POST,
Jan. 7, 2011, at A17 (calling for fiscal discipline, curbing incarceration, seeking smarter,
more cost-effective approaches, and being right on crime).
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dollar burden in difficult budgetary times.371  Here the federal
government can learn from innovations in the states. For example,
Mississippi and Texas cut incarceration costs by improving risk
assessment and sorting to determine who can be more cost-effectively
kept in the community rather than incarcerated.372 Alternatives to
incarceration are expanding in popularity and prevalence even in
tough-on-crime states.7
The federal government, however, has lagged behind the smarter
solutions trend. Federal prison rolls continued to grow-increasing
3.1% in 2011-even as state prison populations have dropped. 37 4
Recently, the United States Department of Justice sounded the alarm
that the increasing federal prison population and expenditures are
"crowding out" investment in crime prevention, threatening to
reverse public safety gains, and "are incompatible with a balanced
crime policy and are unsustainable."" While criminal immigration
sentences are shorter on average than drug sentences, more people
are swept up, meaning more bodies awaiting processing in pretrial
and presentencing detention and more people being sentenced.376
371. See supra Part III.C; see also, e.g., Holiday on ICE: The U.S. Department of
Homeland Security's New Immigration Detention Standards: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong., 2d Sess. at 84-85, 87 (2012) (written testimony by Dr. Dora Schriro, Comm'r,
N.Y.C Dep't of Corr. and former ICE Special Advisor) (describing severe immigration
detention conditions and the need for spending on new and improved detention facilities);
id. at 1 (statement of H. Rep. Elton Gallegly) (expressing outrage over increased spending
on improving conditions in immigration detention facilities); id. at 9-10 (statement of H.
Rep. Zoe Lofgren) (defending spending to avert human rights problems in overcrowded
and under-supervised facilities).
372. See JFA Inst., Reforming Mississippi's Prison System, PEW CTR. ON THE STATES,
4-5 (2010), http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewcenteronthestatesorg
/Initiatives/PSPP/MDOCPaper.pdf?n=8407; Mike Klein, Thinking Outside the Cell: Texas
Innovates to Correct Course in Prison System, GA. PUB. POL'Y FOUND. (Apr. 20, 2010),
http://www.georgiapolicy.org/thinking-outside-the-cell-texas-innovates-to-correct-course-
in-prison-system/
373. See Cadue, supra note 369; Richard Fausset, Prison Reforms No Longer Taboo for
Conservatives, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2011, at Al.
374. CARSON & SABOL, supra note 280, at 2.
375. Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., and Jonathan J.
Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Policy and Legislation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to the Hon. Patti
B. Saris, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (July 23, 2012), at 4-5, available at http://www.
justice.gov/criminallfoialdocs/2012-annual-letter-to-the-us-sentencing-commission.pdf.
376. On any given day, the U.S. Marshals Service has approximately 63,000 people in
custody awaiting processing in federal court. U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE,
http://www.usmarshals.gov/duties/factsheets/facts-2011.html (last updated Apr. 15, 2011).
The vast majority of people in the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service are imprisoned in
a variety of state, local, and private jails. Id. For a discussion of pretrial detention
aggravating overcrowding in detention facilities see, for example, Laura 1. Appleman,
Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, and the Sixth Amendment, 69
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Immigration defendants constitute 45% of all federal defendants
incarcerated pending processing.377 The reform proposed in Part IV.A
of curbing criminalization overbreadth will help decrease the costs of
incarcerating immigrants in criminal proceedings. Incarceration due
to criminal prosecution is only part of the story, however.
As described in Part III.C, civil immigration detention has
exploded over the last fifteen years because of broad mandatory
detention provisions that restrict the ability to sort out those who
might be more cost-effectively kept in alternatives to detention."
Currently, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 governs the arrest, detention, and release
on bond of aliens pending a decision about removal from the United
States.379 The provision gives the Attorney General the option of
detaining arrested aliens, releasing them on bond, or granting
conditional parole.3 s0 The discretion to release on bond rather than
detain is circumscribed, however, for arriving aliens claiming asylum
for whom current law requires mandatory detention.8 1
The discretion to release an alien on bond is also circumscribed
by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which requires the Attorney General to take
into custody any alien who is inadmissible or deportable because of
the commission of a wide array of offenses.382 Potentially qualifying
grounds for mandatory detention range from major to minor,
including prostitution or drug possession if the statutory maximum is
over a year.383 Section 1226(c) incorporates a vast and open-textured
list of potentially qualifying grounds for mandatory detention,
including crimes of "moral turpitude" or "aggravated felonies," a
category so broad that offenses "need not be either aggravated or a
felony."3 84 As Nancy Morawetz has noted, the lists are so broad that
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1315 (2012); Marcia Johnson & Luckett Anthony Johnson,
Bail: Reforming Policies to Address Overcrowded Jails, the Impact of Race on Detention,
and Community Revival in Harris County, Texas, 7 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 42, 47-50
(2012).
377. MOTIVANS, supra note 182, at 28.
378. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012) (prescribing a list of grounds for mandatory
detention).
379. Id. § 1226(a).
380. Id.
381. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) ("Any alien subject to the procedures under this
clause shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and,
if found not to have such a fear, until removed.").
382. Id. § 1226(a).
383. Id. § 1226(c)(1); see also id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), (D)(i) (listing engagement of
prostitution or a controlled substances offense with a statutory maximum of over a year as
qualifying grounds).
384. Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1939, 1941 (2000).
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shoplifting with a one-year suspended sentence might count as an
aggravated felony, and jumping a turnstile or using unauthorized
cable services may constitute crimes of moral turpitude,385 which in
turn are grounds for mandatory detention.386
Because of these broad mandatory detention provisions, the
executive faces the unpalatable choice of building more civil
detention facilities to alleviate the severity of current conditions or
allowing problematic conditions to fester. The current state of
housing civil immigration detainees in conditions for criminals, and
even alongside convicted criminals serving their sentences," strains
both basic principles of United States and international law. The
Supreme Court has historically distinguished between punitive
imprisonment and the "temporary confinement" or "detention" of
arrested persons or aliens in exclusion or removal proceedings.389 Yet
imprisonment in conditions-and even facilities-used for convicted
criminals presents the pains of the paradigmatic form of
punishment.390 Indeed, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights recently found human rights violations in the incarceration
conditions of immigrants not accused, tried, nor convicted of any
crime.39' Incarceration in conditions used for criminals without the
criminal procedural protections required by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments also raises serious constitutional questions.392
The Obama Administration has announced the goal of turning
immigration detention into a "truly civil system" through expensive
improvements to detention conditions and the construction of more
385. Id. at 1941.
386. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1).
387. Bernstein, supra note 294, at A13.
388. See SCHRIRO, supra note 278, at 21.
389. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 234 (1896).
390. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 100 (2003) (describing "the punishment of
imprisonment" as the "paradigmatic affirmative disability or restraint"); Hudson v. United
States, 522 U.S. 93, 104 (1997) (using the " 'infamous punishment' of imprisonment" as the
yardstick for analyzing whether affirmative disabilities or restraints constitute
punishment).
391. See INTER-AM. COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 293, at 85-92, 108-09,
124,148-49.
392. See Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 234, 237 (ruling that imprisonment at hard labor for
less than a year before deportation is akin to what has been considered infamous
punishment in England and America and cannot be imposed without the procedural
protections required by the Fifth and Sixth amendments for adjudication of criminal guilt);
Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 427-28 (1885) (explaining that what is considered infamous
punishment "may be affected by the changes of public opinion from one age to another"
and tracing changes in opinion in what constitutes infamous punishment over time).
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civil facilities.393 The plan of creating a more humane immigration
detention system has faced high hurdles, however, because of outrage
from some legislators over giving illegal aliens a "Holiday on ICE."394
Fewer taxpayer dollars would need to be spent for building facilities
for civil immigration detainees and improving housing, medical,
dental, and other living conditions if fewer immigrants were detained
because of smarter selection of who can remain on bond out in the
community.
The wisdom of saving money by determining who can remain on
bond rather than be detained is not lost on Congress, which has
allocated funds to explore alternatives to immigration detention.39 5
Nor is the need lost on ICE, which oversees alternatives to detention
programs utilizing varying supervision strategies, including GPS
monitoring, radio frequency monitoring, and telephonic reporting.39 6
The rates of absconding for the programs are between 1.5% and
9.5%.397 In 2007, ICE reported that it had "exceeded its funded bed
space level and therefore must apply rigorous criteria to determine
which apprehended aliens are detained."3 98 Despite this recognition,
by 2011, the number of immigration detainees had soared to a record
429,247 people. 9
One of the major handicaps to fully benefitting from improving
risk assessment and launching alternatives to detention programs is
the broad mandatory detention provisions. Some arriving asylum
seekers or people with prior convictions for petty offenses, such as
shoplifting or prostitution, might more cost-effectively remain out on
bond in the community with monitoring and support from community
organizations and family during proceedings rather than being
incarcerated.4" This is especially the case for long-time residents in
393. Bernstein, supra note 294, at A13.
394. Brian Bennett, GOP Mocks "Holiday" Detentions, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2012, at
A14.
395. See, e.g., Gryll, supra note 276, at 1214 (detailing example of long-time permanent
resident with strong family ties in mandatory detention because of prior drug possession
conviction).
396. See, e.g., U.S. IMMIGRATIONS & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ALTERNATIVES TO
DETENTION FOR ICE DETAINEES 1-2 (2009), available at http://www.aila.org/content
/default.aspx?bc=101616715112053126286131038130487.
397. Id.
398. ICE Workforce Raids: Their Impact on U.S. Children, Families, and Communities:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Workforce Protections of the H. Comm. on Educ. and
Labor, 110th Cong. 86 (2007), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
110hhrg42334/pdflCHRG-110hhrg42334.pdf
399. SIMANSKI & SAPP, supra note 277, at 4.
400. See, e.g., Christopher Stone, Supervised Release as an Alternative to Detention in
Removal Proceedings: Some Promising Results of a Demonstration Project, 14 GEO.
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the United States with strong family, community, or faith-based
ties.401 Legislative leadership to curb the costs of immigration
detention is needed to cut back the mandatory detention provisions.
A safety-valve provision that would extend alternatives to detention
for people with low risk of absconding and who present no danger to
the community would better permit the flourishing of more cost-
effective solutions.
CONCLUSION
A great challenge for legal leaders and scholars seeking progress
on fiercely fought and passionately-perceived reform issues such as
immigration is bridging the intractable divide in worldviews. Progress
requires breaking out of the standard endless loop of values conflicts
and talking past each other. To garner support rather than generate
more sound, fury, and defeat, visions of reform must be infused with
multiple meanings that appeal to people with different worldviews
and values. 402 Because the immigration law status quo is weighted
toward a hierarch vision of control, reformers particularly need to
show how values important to hierarchs also are at stake.403
Presenting arguments and proposals that move egalitarians are not
enough."# Bridging worldviews is not merely a strategic device to
achieve progress. The approach can also illuminate overlooked
problems that endanger values and interests important to both sides,
such as immigration criminalization and incarceration overbreadth.405
Demographic power shifts and the need to conserve taxpayer
dollars make the case for reform in terms that implicate the interests
and values of hierarchs as well as egalitarians. The broad structure of
criminalization enables the wasteful and costly criminal processing of
aliens prior to civil removal to bloat conviction statistics while passing
the buck to taxpayers.406 Hinging criminalization of entry or being
IMMIGR. L.J. 673, 675-78, 682-83 (2000) (reporting promising results from a community-
based supervision program).
401. See id. at 682 (noting particular efficacy with certain groups with stronger reasons
to comply).
402. See Kahan, supra note 33, at 145-48 (explaining that expressive
overdetermination-infusing law and policy with a surfeit of meanings so that divergent
worldviews can be simultaneously affirmed-can help people bridge conflicts and make
progress over recurring seemingly intractable controversies).
403. Cf McCann & Lovell, supra note 323, at 8 (explaining power dynamics and tilts in
law).
404. For the mortuary of dead comprehensive immigration reform bills, see supra
notes 4-7.
405. See supra Parts I, 1I.
406. See supra Part III.B.
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found in the United States on alien status also opens the door for
racial relevance in suspicion of criminality because both lawful and
unlawful aliens in the United States are predominantly Hispanic or
Asian.407 Stigmatization and suspicion as potential criminals has
galvanized these rising voter demographic groups and pushed them
leftward, threatening the power base of conservatives.408 On the civil
side of the blurred civil-criminal line in immigration law, widespread
civil immigration detention has consumed billions of taxpayer dollars
and given rise to inhumane conditions.4 09
Drain on national resources is oft-raised by immigration
hardliners concerned about conserving limited resources. 4 10 This
Article has explored how the interest in conserving resources and
government spending counsel for curbing overbreadth in immigration
investigation, prosecution, and incarceration. Moreover, as the
consequences of racial profiling in immigration investigation
galvanize the two fastest-rising voter groups, breaking the link of
racial relevance arising from the structure of immigration
criminalization overbreadth should become a bipartisan reform issue.
To tackle the immense challenge, it is important to understand the
intimate relationship between profiling and the historical ambition
and resulting structure of immigration criminalization detailed in this
article.411
Reform need not mean radical abolition, an accusation that
would be ammunition to kill efforts at progress. Two key reforms
would better constrain waste and destructive discretion and more
effectively target the expensive artillery of criminal law and civil
immigration detention. First, indicia of risk such as significant
criminal history in addition to undocumented status must be required
before the expensive artillery of criminal justice is used. Second, the
federal immigration incarceration system should learn from successes
in the states in reducing reliance on incarceration to cut costs that
outweigh benefits. These reforms will help curb the worst of the fiscal
waste and human harms of immigration incarceration and
prosecution overbreadth.
407. See supra Parts IIA-B, IV.B.
408. See supra Part II.A.
409. See supra Parts III.C, IV.C.
410. See, e.g., supra note 2.
411. See supra Part II.B.
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